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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the growing realization that the Baltic republics are not the 
same, and should not be treated as a single regional bloc. At the same time, merely 
realizing the existence of different priorities for integration with the West is not enough. 
The time is fast approaching when Western European institutions will offer the three 
Baltic republics the opportunity for full membership. Despite this approaching deadline, 
important questions remain unanswered. This thesis answers these questions by 
examining the policies enacted by the Baltic republics since 1995 to further their goal of 
integration with the West. 
This thesis focuses on policies and decisions regarding the European Union and 
NATO, since these are the most important Western European institutions. This thesis will 
identify the priorities that each of the Baltic republics has established for integration and 
trace important changes in these policies over the course of the decade. In the final 
analysis, an assessment will be made of possibilities for integration of each republic 
based on these priorities, and what integration might mean for Europe. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since their annexation by the Soviet Union during World War II - as a result of 
the secret agreement concerning the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence 
between the German Reich and the Soviet Union in 1939, and their integration as Soviet 
republics in 1940 - the United States and the nations of Western Europe viewed the three 
Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as a single bloc within the Soviet Union. 
Rarely was any one of these countries spoken of without mentioning the other 
two. The Baltic republics further solidified this image by acting and "thinking" as one in 
their collective quest to regain their independence from the USSR. Because of these 
activities, the West designed policies toward the Baltic republics as if the republics were 
a kind of single state with singular interests, concerns, and desires for the future. 
This thesis explores the notion that the Baltic republics are not the same, are not 
interchangeable, and should not be treated as a single regional bloc. At the same time, 
merely realizing the existence of different priorities for integration with the West is not 
enough. The time is fast approaching when Western European institutions will offer the 
three Baltic republics the opportunity for full membership. In spite of this approaching 
deadline, important questions concerning this integration remain unanswered. For 
example, is it possible to admit one, or even two, of the three republics without creating 
new or exacerbating old tensions in Eastern Europe? Are all three of the republics even 
going to be ready for full membership, and if not, which might be suited for membership 
and which ones not? Do one or more of them desire to remain associate members or 
observers for the time being? How will the Russian Federation react to the admission of 
xiii 
one or more former Soviet republics to Western institutions? This question is especially 
important with respect to the admission of Lithuania, which, together with Belarus, 
separates the Russian Federation from its Kaliningrad Oblast. 
This thesis answers these questions by examining the actions taken and the 
policies enacted by the Baltic republics since 1995 to further their goal of integration with 
the West. The year 1995 was chosen because it is the year in which all three of the Baltic 
republics had joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which is one of the 
essential requirements for countries seeking admission to the Alliance, and had signed 
Europe Agreements with the EU signifying their interest in working toward admission to 
that institution. This examination will primarily focus on policies and decisions regarding 
the European Union and NATO, since these are the two largest and most important 
Western European institutions. From this examination, it should be possible to determine 
the priorities that each of the Baltic republics has established for integration, and to trace 
any important changes in these policies over the course of the decade. An assessment will 
be made as to possibilities for integration for each of the republics based on these 
priorities, and what integration might mean for Europe as a whole. 
xiv 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
Since their annexation by the Soviet Union during World War II - as a result of 
the secret agreement concerning the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence 
between the German Reich and the Soviet Union in 1939, and their integration as Soviet 
republics in 1940 - the United States and the nations of Western Europe viewed the three 
Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as a singular bloc within the Soviet 
Union.1 Rarely was any one of these countries spoken of without mentioning the other 
two. The Baltic republics further solidified this image by acting and "thinking" as one in 
their collective quest to regain their independence from the USSR. Because of these 
activities, the West designed policies toward the Baltic republics as if the republics were 
a kind of single state with singular interests, concerns, and desires for the future. 
Furthermore, because of the way in which the Soviet Union gained control over them 
through the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the United States, in 
particular, never considered the Baltic republics a "real" part of the Soviet Union.2 This 
1
 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were relegated to the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern 
Europe by the secret protocol of the "Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of 
Socialist Soviet republics, " the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, and the 
"Boundary and Friendship Treaty" signed on 17 September 1939. The Soviet Union accomplished the 
occupation and incorporation of the Baltic republics by accusing them of plotting aggression against the 
USSR, providing a pretext for invasion in June 1940. - Izidors Vizulis, The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 
1939:The Baltic Case (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-19, 30. 
2
 The United States extended full, unrestricted, and unconditional recognition of Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian independence on 28 July 1922. This recognition was never rescinded, nor was recognition 
of the Soviet Union's annexation of the three republics ever granted: In 1952, President Truman spoke of 
"...revulsion at the acts of the sovereign power, whose forcible incorporation of the Baltic States we have 
never recognized...." In 1966, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey: "Our government has soundly refused 
either to condone or to accept the forced illegal annexation of the Baltic Nations and their territories into 
the Soviet Union." Secretary of State George P. Schultz, in 1988: "We have never recognized the forcible 
incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union, nor will we do so." Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, 
echoed this sentiment exactly to the Charge d'Affaires of Lithuania and the Consul General of Estonia in 
February 1989. The government of Canada, the United States House of Representatives, and the Council of 
Europe have made similar statements. - ibid., 135-144. 
1 
situation changed when the Soviet Union crumbled in the early 1990s; an event spurred, 
in part, by the Baltic republics' declarations of independence, which Moscow officially 
recognized and accepted in 1991. 
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the West continued to view the Baltic 
republics as a singular unit, but increasingly, the West has begun to recognize that each 
of the republics is a separate actor on the world stage. The recent adoption of a number of 
cooperative measures by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania aimed at improving their chances 
for gaining admission to Western European security and economic institutions have 
muddled this situation. These measures - to include the military measures, the Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), and the 
Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) - are in no way a substitute for admission into 
western institutions. Instead, they serve as a means for the Baltic republics to better 
prepare their own governments, economies, and societies to meet the rigorous standards 
established by NATO and the European Union (EU). It is in this way and this way alone, 
that the interests of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania coincide. Each of the three republics 
pursued its own path toward independence from the Soviet Union and each one continues 
to pursue its own path toward western integration. 
This thesis explores the notion that the Baltic republics are not the same, are not 
interchangeable, and should not be treated as a single regional bloc. At the same time, 
merely recognizing the existence of different priorities for integration with the West is 
not enough. The time is fast approaching when Western European institutions will offer 
the three Baltic republics the opportunity for full membership. In spite of this 
approaching deadline, important questions concerning this integration remain 
unanswered. For example, is it possible to admit one, or even two, of the three republics 
without creating new or exacerbating old tensions in Eastern Europe? Are all three of the 
republics even going to be ready for full membership, and if not, which might be suited 
for membership and which ones not? Do one or more of them desire to remain associate 
members or observers for the time being? How will the Russian Federation react to the 
admission of one or more former Soviet republics to Western institutions? This question 
is especially important with respect to the admission of Lithuania, which, together with 
Belarus, separates the Russian Federation from its Kaliningrad Oblast. 
This thesis answers these questions by examining the actions taken and the 
policies enacted by the Baltic republics since 1995 to further their goal of integration with 
the West. The year 1995 was chosen because it is the year in which all three of the Baltic 
republics had joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which is one of the 
essential requirements for countries seeking admission to the Alliance, and had signed 
Europe Agreements with the EU signifying their interest in working toward admission to 
that institution. This examination will primarily focus on policies and decisions regarding 
the European Union and NATO, since these are the two largest and most important 
Western European institutions. From this examination, it should be possible to determine 
the priorities that each of the Baltic republics has established for integration, and to trace 
any important changes in these policies over the course of the decade. In the final 
analysis, an assessment will be made as to possibilities for integration for each of the 
republics based on these priorities, and what integration might mean for Europe as a 
whole. 
B.   METHODOLOGY 
The integration priorities of the three Baltic republic are shaped by their policies 
toward the two major Western European institutions, the EU and NATO. This thesis 
explores the integration priorities geared toward these two institutions because the EU 
and NATO are the most important institutions involved in European security and stability 
today. An argument could be made for examining the possibility of integration with other 
European institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) or the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), but neither of these institutions 
operates on the same scope and scale as do the EU and NATO. The EU has absorbed the 
Western European Union (WEU) as the basis for a proposed, though currently unrealized, 
EU military capability. It is unlikely that this capability will be fielded in the near future, 
and it is equally unlikely that it would be capable initially to provide the sort of 
guarantees the Baltic republics seek. The OSCE, for its part, is an organization with a rich 
past and potential for a promising future, but it lacks strong support from the major 
European powers, who tend to look to NATO for security and stability. While it is likely 
that the OSCE will remain a fixture in European stability in the future, it is unlikely that it 
will ever rise to NATO's status, or subsume the responsibilities of the Alliance anytime 
soon. In any case, all three Baltic republics already belong to and are active members of 
the OSCE. Their priorities toward that organization have thus been established. 
Based on these criteria, the methodology involved in this thesis involves two 
steps. The first step is to examine the requirements for admission established by both the 
EU and NATO. By examining these requirements, it will be possible to establish a 
baseline against which the domestic policies of the Baltic republics toward these two 
institutions can be compared. The second step involves the comparison of Baltic 
domestic policies to these established membership requirements. Through this 
comparison, it should be possible to determine the priorities that each of the Baltic 
republics has established for integration. 
One difficulty that may occur in this analysis is the possibility of overlapping 
interests of both the EU and NATO. Both institutions promote security and stability in 
Europe, and both promote respect for the rule of law and the strengthening of democracy 
as means toward creating security and stability. Despite these similarities, however, 
NATO and the EU have very different agendas for their members. In spite of its recent 
expansion into peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, NATO is essentially a military 
alliance that uses democracy and the rule of law as guiding principles for the conduct of 
its members' military forces. The EU, on the other hand, is an economic union that is 
slowly growing into a political union, in which democracy and the rule of law promote 
the stability necessary for economic markets and free trade to flourish. While it may be 
difficult to assess these differences at first glance, this thesis will assess the sum total of 
all of the policy decisions made by each of the Baltic republics to determine a pattern in 
policy considerations. 
1. Membership Requirements of the European Union 
The quest for European unity began in the wake of World War II as the nations of 
Europe struggled to find a way in the future to avoid the misery and destruction wrought 
by two World Wars. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill first proposed the idea for 
a "United States of Europe" in 1946. Although this idea never developed in quite the way 
that Churchill hoped, European unity did develop into its present form through the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Community 
in 1958 and the Single European Act in 1987. From these somewhat humble beginnings, 
the idea of European integration culminated in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which created the European Union, in 1993. Regardless of its name, or the number or 
composition of its member states, the idea of the EU has always embodied a quest for 
peace and stability on the European continent through economic and political means. The 
central idea has been that by erasing boundaries between the countries of Europe, all 
Europeans will come to see that they have more in common with one another and are 
stronger as a whole than they are as individuals, than they have previously believed. All 
of these institutions sought to promote stability and peace in Europe. 
Since the end of the Second World War, three treaties have formed the basis for 
the idea of European unity: 
• The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
signed in Paris and entered into force on 23 July 1952, 
• The Treaty establishing the European Community,  signed in Rome and 
entered into force on 1 January 1958, and 
• The    Treaty    establishing    the    European    Atomic    Energy    Community 
(EURATOM) signed in Rome and entered into force on 1 January 1958. 
These founding treaties have been amended on several occasions since their signing, in 
particular when new member states acceded in 1973, 1981, 1986, and 1995. In addition, 
three other treaties that introduced major institutional changes and new areas of 
responsibility for the European institutions were signed and entered into force in the last 
two decades: 
• The Single European Act (SEA), signed in Luxembourg and The Hague and 
entered into force on 1 July 1987, 
• The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht and entered into force on 
1 November 1993, 
• The Treaty of Amsterdam, which strengthened the three pillars of the 
European Union (the European Communities, the common foreign and 
security policy, and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs), 
entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
Finally, the Treaty of Nice, agreed upon at the European Council on 7-9 
December 2000 and signed on 26 February 2001, amends the existing treaties, and 
provides guidelines for the current round of expansion negotiations. It will enter into 
force once the EU's 15 member states have ratified it.3 
The European Union has already gone through four rounds of enlargement since 
its inception as the European Coal and Steel Commission. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom joined the European Community, followed by Greece in 1981, 
Spain, and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. As the twenty- 
first century dawns, the Union is preparing to enlarge once again, with 13 aspirants 
seeking admission. At its 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU decided on the format of the 
current enlargement process, and, on 31 March 1998, formally launched accession 
negotiations with six of the countries seeking membership, including Estonia.4 The 
European Commission later recommended, in an October 1999 composite paper, to open 
accession negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania. 'ov 
The European Council established the basis for these negotiations at its 1993 
Copenhagen Summit. In Copenhagen, the Council indicated that accession would become 
a possibility for each aspirant when it was able to assume the obligations of membership 
3
 The European Union, "European Treaties," available [online]: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/treaties_en.htm 
4 The European Commission, "EU Enlargement - A Historic opportunity," available [online]: 
http://europa.eu.mt/comm/enlargement/intro/index.htm 
7 
by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.5 In broad terms, these 
membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, require that the candidate 
country has achieved: 
• Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.6 
In addition, each candidate country must demonstrate that it has 
• Created the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its 
administrative structures, so that European Community legislation transposed 
into national legislation is implemented through appropriate administrative 
and judicial structures.7 
Taken at face value, these requirements appear to be relatively benign, but for 
countries that until very recently have been ruled by authoritarian regimes and have 
operated under command economies, they can be daunting tasks. Indeed, for many of the 
candidate countries, meeting these requirements has meant an almost complete overhaul 
of government, economy, and society. 
2. Membership Requirements of NATO 
Enlargement of the NATO Alliance is addressed in Article 10 of the Washington 
Treaty that established the Alliance. Article 10 states, "The Parties may, by unanimous 
5






agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this 
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this 
Treaty."8 NATO began its process of enlargement in 1952 with the accession of Turkey 
and Greece, followed by West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982; the issue came 
under consideration again in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance codified its expansion plans, in the form of the 
Open Door Policy and embodied in its new Strategic Concept and the Membership 
Action Plan, at the 1999 50th anniversary summit held in Washington, DC. The new 
Strategic Concept states, "No European democratic country whose admission would 
fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration [for 
membership]."9 NATO displayed its adherence to these ideals in 1999 when Hungary, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic were admitted as new members. 
Given that NATO is open to the enlargement of the Alliance, the membership 
requirements established by NATO for new members must be examined. NATO first laid 
ground with its "Enlargement Study" and later established the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) at the Washington Summit as a method of assisting aspiring countries in their 
preparations for possible future membership in the Alliance.10 Although the MAP 
provides a list of issues that aspiring countries must address, the MAP is in no way 
intended to be a list of criteria for membership. In other words, successfully addressing 
all of the issues outlined in the MAP provides no guarantee that the Alliance will extend a 
8
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information 
and Press, 1998), 398 
9
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 
April 1999 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), 54 
membership invitation to any aspirant. Having stated that, the MAP provides the best 
"road map" for countries seeking to gain admission to the Alliance. 
The MAP divides the issues that aspiring members must address into five 
categories: 
• Political and Economic Issues 
• Defense/Military Issues 
• Resource Issues 
• Security Issues 
• Legal Issues 
A complete list of all of the issues encompassed by each of these categories is too 
cumbersome to reproduce here. For the purposes of establishing the membership 
requirements for aspiring members, a sampling of issues from each of the MAP 
categories follows: 
• Political and Economic Issues. 
• Aspirants must conform to the basic principles embodied in the 
Washington Treaty, such as the principles of democracy and the respect 
for individual liberty. 
• Defense/Military Issues. 
• Aspirants must be willing and able to contribute militarily to collective 
defense and to the Alliance's new missions. They must also commit to 
gradual improvements in their military capabilities. 
• Full participation in operational Partnership for Peace is essential. 
• Aspirants must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, 
benefits, and burdens of common security and collective defense. They 
must also be willing to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the 
Strategic Concept. 
10 ibid., 73 
10 
• Resource Issues 
• Aspirants are expected to be able to commit sufficient budget resources to 
allow themselves to meet the commitments entailed by membership. They 
must also plan and implement defense budgets that meet established 
defense priorities and make provisions for training with NATO forces. 
• Security Issues 
• Aspirants must be able to provide sufficient safeguards and procedures to 
ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in 
NATO security policy. 
• Legal Issues 
• Aspirants must examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal 
arrangements and agreements that govern cooperation within NATO. 
They must scrutinize domestic law for compatibility with NATO rules and 
regulations.l' 
In addition to meeting the requirements of the issues outlined in the MAP, aspirants must 
also agree to comply with the other parts of the NATO "acquis." These parts include 
NATO's Strategic Concept, the development of the European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the NATO- 
Ukraine Charter. 12 
C.        THE WAY AHEAD - AN OUTLINE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE 
THESIS 
This chapter, Chapter I, is the introductory chapter for this thesis. Chapter I 
provides the basic background of the question to be answered and the methodology to be 
used in arriving at that answer. As part of this methodology, the first chapter examines 
the membership requirements established by the European Union and NATO for 
prospective members. These membership requirements provide the essential baseline 
1
' ibid., 74-78 
12
 ibid., 75. The Membership Action plan is presented, in foil, as Appendix A. 
11 
against which domestic policy considerations will be compared to determine integration 
priorities of the three Baltic republics. Additionally, it provides an outline of the 
remaining chapters in the thesis. 
Chapter II, Estonian Priorities for Integration, examines the domestic policy 
decisions that Estonia has made in recent years toward integration with Western Europe. 
Estonia is the smallest of the Baltic republics and is unique among them in that it was 
able to regain its independence from the Soviet Union without facing the sort of violence 
that characterized the independence movements in Latvia and Lithuania. Like Latvia, and 
in contrast to Lithuania, Estonia has taken strong efforts in the past decade to limit the 
ability of non-natives to participate in the political process. Estonia is also the most 
western leaning of the three Baltic republics, a factor that makes it especially appealing 
for integration in western institutions. All of these factors play an important role in 
shaping Estonia's policies concerning Western Europe. 
Chapter III, Latvian Priorities for Integration, examines Latvian domestic policy 
decisions toward integration with Western Europe. In contrast to the experience of 
Estonia in the early 1990s, Latvia faced difficult times during this period. During the 
Soviet period, Latvia was much more heavily "colonized" by immigrants from the Soviet 
Union, to the point that Latvians became a minority in most urban areas. In addition, the 
Soviets were much more ruthless in their repression of Latvia than the other Baltic 
republics during this period. Consequently, Latvian independence movements were less 
vociferous than their Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts, leading some to believe that 
Latvians valued independence less than the other two Baltic republics. Decisions 
regarding her minority population of ethnic Russians and the presence of significant 
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numbers of Russian troops stationed on Latvian soil posed significant problems for the 
newly independent state, including violent efforts to prevent Latvian independence from 
being realized. These problems were not fully resolved until 1994 when a citizenship law 
was passed that dealt with the minorities, and an agreement between the Latvian Saeima 
and the Russian Duma was reached regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops. Like the 
rest of the Baltic republics, Latvia faces difficult questions regarding her place in Europe, 
questions that she has yet to answer. 
Chapter IV, Lithuanian Priorities for Integration, examines Lithuanian domestic 
policy decisions toward integration with Western Europe. Lithuania has struggled for its 
existence for hundreds of years. For a large part of the 18th and 19th centuries, Lithuania 
formed a constituent part of either Poland or Russia. Following the brief period of 
independence between the two World Wars, Lithuania formed a part of the Soviet Union. 
Independence has thus been a dream that has been a long time coming. Like Latvia, 
Lithuania has a large ethnic Russian minority population, had to deal with Russian troops 
stationed in Lithuania after independence, and was the subject of violent attempts by the 
Russian Federation to prevent her from gaining independence. Additionally, Lithuania 
neighbors the Kaliningrad Oblast, a situation that has required making arrangements for 
Russian troops and supplies to traverse Lithuanian and Belarusian territory to maintain 
this exclave. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Lithuania has pursued policies of 
inclusion for its ethnic minorities. Consequently, the Russian Federation, and those ethnic 
Russians living in Lithuania, plays a major role in Lithuania's policies and decisions. 
Chapter V, An Assessment of Baltic Priorities for Integration, evaluates the policy 
choices each of the Baltic republics has made during the 1990s. From this evaluation, an 
13 
assessment can be made of the priorities that each of the Baltic republics has chosen 
regarding its integration with Western Europe. In addition to this evaluation, an 
assessment will be made regarding the possible ramifications of integration and what 
these priorities and policies might mean for Europe as a whole. 
14 
II. ESTONIA'S PRIORITIES FOR INTEGRATION 
A.        INTRODUCTION: WHY WOULD ESTONIA WANT TO INTEGRATE 
WITH WESTERN EUROPE? 
Estonia, like its neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, had to start from scratch 
following independence in 1991. At that time, primarily due to its recent history as part 
of the highly centralized Soviet system, Estonia lacked working state institutions, a 
world-wide network of diplomatic services, armed forces, its own currency, a 
constitution, and up-to date legislation on par with other European democratic, market- 
oriented states.13 Soviet occupation held Estonia back decades when compared to her 
European neighbors, and ensured that she could not survive in the Europe of the late 
twentieth century on her own. Partly because of this fact, and partly because of a 
perceived historical and legal continuity of Estonian statehood and Estonia's historical 
experience with Western Europe, Estonia became arguably the most Western oriented of 
the three Baltic republics. None of these factors completely explains Estonia's Western 
orientation in and of itself, but taken together they do provide a good explanation of why 
Estonia would seek integration with Western Europe. 
1. Historical and Legal Continuity 
Estonia does not have a long history of independent statehood. For the better part 
of two and a half centuries, Estonia formed a constituent part of the Russian Empire and 
its successor, the Soviet Union. In fact, the sum total of Estonia's independent history 
encompasses approximately 22 years, from 1918 to 1940. Despite this limited amount of 
independence in her past, Estonia does not view herself as the legal successor state of the 
13
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Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. Instead, the Estonian state that gained independence 
in August 1991 saw itself as the successor to the independent Estonian State of the inter- 
war years.14 This notion of the historical and legal continuity of the Estonian state forms 
the foundation upon which current political thinking and decision-making are based, in 
particular with regard to foreign policy decisions.15 
Although Estonia harbors relatively naive beliefs about the nature of her past, she 
realized during the early part of the 1990s that notions of historical and legal continuity 
have little significance with regard to security concerns at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century. Estonian concepts of security were simplistic and one-dimensional following 
independence; military strength and force were considered crucial elements in the 
defense of Estonian independence through the middle part of the 1990s.16 The second 
half of the 1990s brought a growing realization that the basis for security in Europe today 
rests on more than the size and strength of one's military. Estonia was not strong enough, 
big enough, or rich enough to make her own way in the world today. Cooperation with 
the rest of Europe and integration with Western European political, economic, and 
security structures had become a necessity for survival.17 
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2. Historical Experience 
A second explanation for Estonia's western orientation centers on her past 
experience with Western Europe. During her previous period of independence, Estonia 
maintained diplomatic missions in 10 European capitals, as well as in other parts of the 
world. Estonia was also a member of the League of Nations, having joined in September 
1921.18 Consequently, despite a relatively short period of independence, Estonia has a 
history of diplomatic ties with Western Europe and of participation in Western security 
institutions. Following independence, many of Estonia's former diplomatic ties picked up 
where they left off in 1940. The countries of the European Commission and the Nordic 
countries announced the resumption of normal diplomatic relations shortly after Baltic 
independence. The United Nations admitted Estonia on 17 September 1991, and the 
Council of Europe did so in May 1993.19 This historical diplomatic experience with 
Western Europe added to the idea of historical and legal continuity has undoubtedly 
contributed to Estonia's desire to integrate in some way with Western Europe. 
B.        ESTONIA'S STATED PRIORITIES WITH REGARD TO NATO AND EU 
ACCESSION 
With the establishment of the historical perspective behind Estonia's Western 
orientation complete, it is possible to examine Estonia's stated priorities with regard to 
NATO and EU accession. Estonia currently holds membership in a number of the most 
important European institutions. She is a full member of the OSCE, the Council of 
from history, we have to acknowledge that without support from the rest of the world we are unable to 
defend Estonia. Our aspirations to integrate into Western economic, political, and security structures are 
therefore understandable." ibid., 29. 
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Europe, and the United Nations, although the last is not strictly a European institution. At 
the same time, Estonia is an Associate Partner of the WEU, an aspirant for NATO 
membership, and an Associate Member of the EU. Estonia turned the full focus of her 
attention on the last of these institutions in the middle part of the 1990s by joining 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and signing a Europe Agreement with 
the EU in 1995 signifying her desire to begin the accession process. Since that time, 
Estonia has focused the bulk of her foreign policy decisions toward gaining admission to 
these two institutions. 
In a word, Estonia seeks security. Her position between Europe and Russia, added 
to her history of foreign domination, demand it. Estonia adheres to the basic principle that 
the security of all states is indivisible and no one state can achieve security at the expense 
of any other state.20 Based on this, Estonia is pursuing membership in the EU and NATO 
in parallel, in the words of Minister of Foreign Affairs Toomas lives, "not preferring one 
to the other, and not seeing one as a substitute for the other."21 In a 1998 speech at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, lives expanded on this topic saying, 
"The EU is neither an alternative nor substitute to NATO. Estonia's 
prospects for EU membership look good, but this does not mean that we 
should be made to wait indefinitely to join NATO. Nor does it mean that 
our aspirations to join NATO have waned."22 
20
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In addition, Estonia's ruling coalition government made EU and NATO accession top 
foreign policy priorities in their 1999 coalition agreement saying the objective of 
Estonia's foreign policy is to "defend Estonia's security and worthy place in the open 
world."23 Clearly, both NATO and EU membership are at the top of Estonia's foreign 
policy priorities. 
Estonian leaders have been very careful to ensure that the leadership councils of 
both NATO and the EU understand that Estonia knows the difference between the two 
institutions. Estonia seeks EU membership because of what the EU is in and of itself, and 
what it offers and demands of its member states.24 The political and economic benefits of 
EU membership are of paramount importance to Estonia. Estonia understands that EU 
membership is not a security guarantee, but firmly believes that the EU has created the 
non-military basis for security and stability in Europe for the last 50 years.25 
Estonia's reasons for seeking NATO membership are, perhaps, best illustrated by 
remarks made by Foreign Minister lives in 1997 at Columbia University in New York. In 
those remarks, lives noted that if NATO decided not to enlarge, the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe would be forced to look to each other and to other arrangements for 
security. The result would be a re-nationalization of foreign and defense policy, a result 
that history has shown to be a dangerous one. He further noted that applicant countries 
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want in to NATO for the same reason that others stay in: they recognize the military 
benefits of collective security and the political benefits ofthat stability.26 At the same 
time, Estonia believes that the nature of the new NATO has changed in recent years, such 
that Alliance activities are less concentrated on collective defense in a narrow sense. 
Instead, the Alliance now focuses more on developing the means to act with partners in 
defense of wider, common interests.27 Thus, Estonia views NATO not so much as a 
defensive alliance as it is a community of states dedicated to the defense of certain 
universal values.28 Finally, Estonia's National Security Concept, approved by Estonia's 
parliament, the Riigikogu, on 6 March 2001, argues that seeking membership in NATO is 
the best way to protect and consolidate the modern democratic state. The National 
Security Concept states that full integration with NATO will ensure a stable climate for 
economic development and provide the opportunity to participate in international security 
efforts, as well as to utilize Estonia's national defense resources in the most effective 
way.29 
C.        INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Estonia has made it clear that she seeks EU membership because of the political 
and economic stability that membership provides. For Estonia, European integration is 
not a goal in and of itself. It is a means of meeting her national objectives of building a 
26
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State based on European traditions and values, developing a functioning market economy, 
consolidating democracy, and creating a stable and prosperous society.30 Chapter 1 of 
this thesis discussed the membership requirements outlined by the EU at the 1993 
European Council Summit in Copenhagen. These requirements are composed of three 
general areas that are best described as political criteria, economic criteria, and the ability 
to assume the obligations of membership. This section of the thesis will examine how 
well Estonia has implemented policy decisions focused toward these goals based on 
regular progress reports produced by the European Commission and Estonia's annual 
reports on her National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). 
The European Commission produces annual reports detailing the progress of each 
of the applicant countries towards integration. The Commission produced its initial 
opinions on the candidates' membership applications in 1997, and produced regular 
reports updating the progress of each applicant in 1998, 1999, and 2000. The National 
Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, a document produced each year by the candidate 
country after the Commission produces its Regular Report, outlines the government's 
plans for the coming year to address the deficiencies noted in that year's Regular Report 
of the Commission. Comparing these two documents will give the best assessment of 
how well Estonia is meeting the accession requirements. 
29
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1. Political Criteria 
Estonia assumed the characteristics of a democratic society quickly after 
regaining independence in 1991, and by 1992, her present political system was firmly in 
place. This speedy change from authoritarian to democratic rule can be attributed mainly 
to Estonia's creation of alternatives to Soviet-era political institutions almost immediately 
after such alternatives were legalized.31 In some respects, her years of Soviet domination 
may have served her well, if for no other reason than they gave Estonia's future leaders 
examples of poor political and economic processes to avoid. The Copenhagen Summit's 
political criteria addressed two main issues: democracy and the rule of law and human 
rights and the protection of minorities. 
In its 1997 opinion on Estonia's membership application, the European 
Commission concluded that Estonia presented the characteristics of a democracy, with 
stable institutions that guaranteed the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities. Based on this, the Commission indicated a number of areas in 
which Estonia needed to make progress in order to fulfill completely the requirements of 
the political criteria. These deficiencies included efforts necessary to improve the 
operation of the judicial system and intensify the fight against corruption and the need for 
measures to accelerate naturalization procedures to enable Estonia's Russian-speaking 
non-citizens to become better integrated into society.32 In addition, the EU's Accession 
Partnership with Estonia indicated the need for measures to facilitate the naturalization 
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process and integration of non-citizens, especially stateless children, and to enhance 
Estonian language training for non-Estonian speakers.33 
Estonia accomplished only relatively minor achievements in these areas in 1998. 
The European Commission responded by recommending adoption of proposed 
amendments to Estonia's Citizenship Law regarding eligibility requirements for children 
of stateless persons. The Commission additionally noted the need for public 
administration reform based on the insufficient skill level of Estonia's public 
administration staff and the high turnover of staff personnel.34 The Commission's 
concern was based on the need for a skilled bureaucracy to ensure the adequate 
implementation and enforcement of the acquis. With respect to the judiciary, the 
Commission noted problems with an insufficient number of judges and lawyers, low 
salaries for judges in particular, a general lack of knowledge of the application of civil 
and criminal law in Estonia's new judicial code, and the need to elaborate new laws in 
keeping with the norms of the EU.35 
These areas remained Estonia's primary obstacles throughout the period under 
examination. In 1999, the European Commission observed very slow progress toward 
judicial and public administration reform. Estonia failed to make substantial progress 
increasing either judicial salaries or the numbers of judges and lawyers, but she did 
successfully implement the Office of Public Administration Reform (OP AR) in January 
33
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1999 and elaborated new plans for EU training of civil servants.36 In addition, during this 
period, Estonia laid the groundwork for an Integration Foundation charged with 
developing a state integration program for the period 2000 - 2007.37 The Commission 
also continued to recommend adopting the proposed amendments to the 1992 Citizenship 
Law, in addition to amendments to the 1995 Language Law that would improve access 
for non-Estonian speakers in political and economic life.38 
By 2000, the European Commission could commend Estonia for significant 
progress in some areas and offer sound recommendations for further improvement in 
others. Although Estonia made some progress toward judicial reform, more and better 
training for judges and increased numbers of those judges continued to be required in 
order to meet the standards in this area.39 At the same time, however, Estonia did amend 
the Citizenship Law to lift the language and civic test requirements for the disabled and 
amended the Language Law to bring it in line with international standards. In addition, 
Estonia adopted the state integration program, "Integration in Estonian Society, 2000 - 
2007," which focused on social unification based on linguistic, legal/political, and socio- 
economic integration.40 Unfortunately, despite its designation as a major political priority 
in 1999, Estonia failed to develop a comprehensive strategy for public administration 
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reform beyond OP AR, and the Public Administration Reform framework document that 
OP AR submitted to the Riigikogu for approval in March 2000 remained stuck in 
committee.41 The one bright spot in this reform effort was the satisfactory progress of the 
EU training program for civil servants. 
Estonia's solid democratic foundation early in her newest period of independence 
no doubt set the stage for her overall success in meeting the goals of the political criteria. 
Although progress was slow in some areas, such as judicial reform, her progress in the 
integration of minorities and non-citizens provides real hope for a promising future. 
Estonia's attitudes toward ethnic minority groups during the early independence 
movements were extremely xenophobic. The basis for citizenship during this early period 
rested primarily on the Estonian language and the presence of either the individual or an 
ancestor in Estonia at the time of Soviet occupation.42 The amendments of the citizenship 
and language laws, and the development of the state integration program, are definitely 
positive steps toward the continuance of a democratic system in Estonia. With positive 
steps toward integration in place, the only truly troubling area that was still in need of 
reform at the end of 2000 was the public administration. Without a strong public 
administration staffed by knowledgeable civil servants, Estonia will have a difficult time 
adopting the acquis in time to accede to the Union in the next round of enlargement 
proposed for 2002. 
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2. Economic Criteria 
Economic integration is one of the most important aspects of the European Union, 
and has always been a cornerstone of the EU, even before any talk of political union 
began. The benefits to member states of free movement of labor, goods, services, and 
capital, coupled with the economic stability provided by the backing of the Union, have 
created strong incentives to those candidate countries seeking a way to ensure economic 
prosperity in the future. Between 1997 and 2000, with the exception of a slight downturn 
in the wake of the 1998 Russian financial crisis, Estonia had the most rapidly growing 
economy in the world and the largest economy of the three Baltic republics. The primary 
reasons for her impressive growth include progress in reducing inflation and controlling 
public finances, in addition to high productivity growth.43 All of these factors were built 
on a foundation laid shortly after independence. In 1992, Estonia established her own 
currency, the Kroon, and tied it to the Deutsche Mark at a fixed rate. The result, by 1995, 
was a stable monetary climate that allowed Estonia to shift some of its foreign trade away 
from Russia, traditionally her largest trading partner, and sign free trade agreements with 
Finland and Sweden.44 
With respect to the economic criteria for accession, the Copenhagen Criteria 
addressed two main issues: the existence of a functioning market economy and the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. The 1997 
European Commission Opinion on Estonia's prospects for accession concluded Estonia 
was a functioning market economy that should be able to make the progress necessary to 
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cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. The opinion 
recognized Estonia's efforts to radically liberalize foreign trade and privatize the public 
sector, liberalize prices to a great degree, and reduce inflation. In addition, the opinion 
noted the existence of the outline of a regulatory legislative framework to oversee 
economic matters. The European Commission noted the slow pace of land reform, the 
failure to start any type of pension system reform, the need to strengthen the private 
sector through the emergence of small and medium enterprises, privatization of 
infrastructure enterprises, such as railways and energy producers, increased agricultural 
production, and an increased export base to diversify trade as areas requiring greater 
reform efforts.45 
Over the course of the next three years, the Commission followed Estonia's 
progress along these, and other lines, to assess her potential to meet the requirements of 
the economic criteria. The Commission happily noted progress in some areas, and 
recommended greater efforts in areas that lagged behind. For example, the privatization 
of infrastructure enterprises proceeded at an acceptable pace with a small railway sold 
and two power grids put up sale during 1998, and the privatization of nearly all small- 
and medium-sized enterprises by the end of 1999.46 At the same time, land reform and 
privatization made little progress over this same period, and by the time the European 
Commission published its 2000 Regular Report, only one-third of all land had been 
returned to private ownership. The Commission blamed declining agricultural production 
in each year from 1998 - 2000 on the failure to privatize land quickly enough and the 
45
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near complete lack of a functioning market for agricultural land.47 In addition, the 
European Commission was troubled by the fact that 60 percent of Estonia's foreign trade 
activity was concentrated in four countries in 1998, a number that rose to 73 percent by 
2000.48 In the Commission's opinion, high concentrations of foreign trade with a 
restricted number of partners left Estonia vulnerable to shocks to the economy brought on 
by economic decline in a trade partner. This situation was partially borne out in 1998 
when the economic collapse in Russia, one of Estonia's largest trading partners, caused a 
comparable slowdown in Estonia.49 
Estonia set lofty goals for meeting the economic criteria in 2000. As part of the 
harmonization of trade policies with the EU, Estonia planned to introduce agricultural 
tariffs effective 1 January 2000 to bolster domestic competition. In addition, the 
government planned to complete privatization of the state railway by 31 December 2000, 
and continue the further privatization of energy production. Finally, the government 
announced planned amendments to the Land Reform Act that would speed up the pace of 
land reform and privatization.50 Under these reforms, the government expected to 
complete land privatization by the end of 2001. 
The Commission's 2000 Regular Report expressed general satisfaction with 
Estonia's efforts in 2000, but, as always, noted areas for future improvement. On 1 
January 2000, Estonia introduced the agricultural tariffs proposed in the 2000 NPAA. 
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Significant progress occurred in the privatization of railways, energy producers, and 
Estonia's oil-shale mining industry. By the time the Commission published the 2000 
Regular Report only a small number of large companies still awaited privatization.51 As 
already addressed, land reform and privatization led to the return of one-third of the total 
land stock to private ownership, and trade with the EU increased to 73 percent of 
Estonia's imports and exports. For the future, the Commission proposed land 
privatization, improved access to market-based credit for agriculture and small- and 
medium-sized businesses, continued reform of the infrastructure, and further land reforms 
as priorities for reform.52 
Estonia displayed steady progress toward the fulfillment of the economic criteria 
during the period 1997 - 2000. Some areas, such as privatization of industrial enterprises, 
progressed more rapidly toward this goal than others, but Estonia made progress 
nonetheless. It is interesting to note that despite the existence in Estonia of a functioning 
market economy, there was no functioning market for agricultural land. The lack of such 
a market, coupled with the decline in agricultural production over this period, does not 
bode well for Estonia's chances to implement the provisions of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, one of the key elements of the EU acquis to be addressed in the next section. 
3. Ability to Assume the Obligations of Membership 
The requirement to be able to assume the obligations of membership deals with 
the EU's acquis, the legal and institutional framework that regulates and governs the 
Union's activities. The ability of any applicant to implement the acquis is essential to its 
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ability to function within the Union.53 In this regard, the acquis is likely the most 
important of the three categories. 
The acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that bind all of the 
member states together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and 
comprises to following: 
• Content, principles and political objectives of the various treaties on European 
Union, 
• Legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the 
European Court of Justice, 
• Declarations and resolutions adopted by the EU, 
• Measures relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), 
• Measures relating to justice and home affairs, and 
• International agreements concluded by the European Community and those 
concluded by the member states between themselves in the field of the 
Union's activities. 
Thus the Community acquis comprises not only Community law in the strictest 
sense, but also includes all acts adopted under the second and third pillars of the 
European Union, which deal with the CFSP and police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, and, above all, the common objectives laid down in the Treaties.54 
Applicant countries have to accept the acquis before they can join the European 
Union. Exemptions from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances and are 
limited in scope. The Union has committed itself to maintaining the acquis in its entirety 
and to developing it even further. There is no question of going back on it.55 
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Consequently, the acquis is an enormous body of documents, legislation, and 
treaties that covers every aspect of life within the European Union. It currently governs 
nearly thirty aspects of EU practices grouped into the following broad categories: 
• Internal market without frontiers 
• Innovation 
• Economic and fiscal affairs 
• Sectoral policies 
• Economic and social cohesion 
• Quality of life and environment 
• Justice and home affairs 
• External policies 
• Financial questions 
Examining in detail how Estonia meets the requirements of every category in the acquis 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, a general overview of problem areas and 
Estonia's efforts to correct deficiencies will suffice. 
In general, the European Commission's 1997 opinion concluded that Estonia was 
generally well prepared to assume the obligations of membership. Areas of concern 
primarily included the need for legal and legislative reforms to ensure the harmonization 
of Estonia's institutions with those of the EU. Particular areas of concern to the 
Commission included the need for: 
• Wide-ranging legislative reform to bring Estonia's institutions and structures 
in almost every area in line with those of the EU, 
• Agricultural and fisheries reform, 
• Reform of the employment and social affairs system, and 
• Extreme efforts to counter the environmental damage done by 50 years of 
Soviet occupation. 
Some of these issues have already been addressed in the preceding sections on the 
political and economic criteria for accession. The acquis explores each of these issues in 
detail and offers very specific examples of what the candidate country must do to in order 
to adopt the acquis. 
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Legislative reform covers every area of the acquis. It is not unreasonable to note 
that many of Estonia's laws and procedures regarding everything from employment to 
agriculture, economic competition to taxation, do not comply with those of the EU. In 
this respect, Estonia is similar to virtually every other candidate. Most of the 
Commission's recommendations in its Regular Reports have been little more than to 
implement the legislation that it recommends. By 2000, for example, the Commission 
noted deficiencies in customs legislation and the need to align VAT and excise tax 
legislation with EU standards.56 Significant efforts on Estonia's part are still required to 
ensure that her entire legal framework is compatible with that of the EU. 
The issue of agriculture and fisheries constituted an area of extreme concern for 
the Commission throughout this period. The heart of the problem in these areas was the 
complete lack in Estonia of any structures or legislation relevant to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) or the Common Fisheries Policy. In its 1997 Opinion, the 
European Commission noted that Estonia would need substantial efforts to align her 
policies with the acquis in both of these sectors. The Commission noted progress toward 
this goal in the agricultural sector in 1998 and 1999, but no progress in the fisheries 
sector in either year.57 In 1999, for example, the Commission recommended speeding up 
the implementation of CAP legislation, while in fisheries, it noted the complete lack of 
progress in implementing any relevant legislation or structural reforms toward the 
Common Fisheries Policy.58 In 2000, the Commission recognized substantial 
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improvement in the establishment of a legal framework for the future implementation of 
the CAP, and recommended the introduction of quality and marketing standards in line 
with EU standards. At the same time, Estonia finally made progress in the fisheries sector 
worth noting, and the Commission recommended the introduction of inspection and 
control mechanisms, a fleet register, market organizations in fisheries products, and a 
restructuring plan for the fisheries fleet.59 Both sectors have a long way to go, but 
progress continues in each. 
The category of employment and social affairs deals primarily with public health, 
labor law, working conditions, equal opportunity, and social security and pension 
schemes. The Commissions 1997 Opinion noted the need for strenuous efforts to bring 
Estonia's legislation in these matters in line with the EU. The 1998 and 1999 Regular 
reports noted limited progress in these areas, and especially commented on the need to 
address employment and social affairs issues, such as equal opportunity and labor law. 
Little has changed since those reports. Estonia's Labor Law, which predates the accession 
negotiations, does not comply with EU standards, nor has the government made any 
progress toward changing it. Estonia re-established her Labor Market Board in January 
1999, but it does not comply with the acquis, either. Estonia did adopt a legal framework 
to address health and safety at work, but a number of regulations still need to be adapted 
to complete the alignment of this framework with the acquis. Finally, even though 
Estonia participated in a number of international projects concerning equal opportunity, 
she made no progress in that area in 2000.60 In the 1999 Regular Report, the Commission 
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noted, "Estonia's capacity to enforce the social acquis represents] a serious cause of 
concern."61 Obviously, there is still a long way to go in this arena. 
In spite of her history of Soviet occupation and the heavy environmental toll that 
occupation has taken on other countries, Estonia's environment at the beginning of the 
accession negotiations was in remarkably good shape. The sharp decline in agricultural 
and industrial production that resulted from the withdrawal of the Soviet command 
economy played a large role in this, as did high levels of Estonian investment in 
environmental protection following independence. The other side of the coin has been 
that Estonia inherited a vast amount of environmental waste and pollutants from the 
Soviet Union. It is this legacy that has made adopting the acquis difficult. Estonia has 
taken significant efforts to meet the needs of the acquis in this respect. Estonia has passed 
a large body of legislation with respect to environmental protection, with varying degrees 
of compliance with the acquis. The European Commission has recognized the Ambient 
Air Protection Act and the Pollution Charges Act, for example, as quite advanced. By the 
same token, legislation such as the Act on the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified 
Organisms and the Protection and Use of Wild Fauna Act, do not fully comply with the 
acquis and will require a lot of work to bring them in compliance.62 Estonia is likely to be 
very successful in meeting the standards of this area of the acquis due to the large amount 
of money already spent on the problem, and the strong desire in the government to be 
free of the remnants of Soviet occupation. 
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These four issue areas obviously do not represent the full scope of Estonia's 
efforts toward the adoption of the acquis. They do offer, however, a glimpse of some of 
the difficulties and successes with which Estonia has met. Overall, the European 
Commission has remarked that Estonia is in a good position to successfully implement all 
aspects of the acquis, although significant efforts are still required.63 Only time will tell 
how well Estonia is able to live up to this claim. 
D.        INTEGRATION WITH NATO 
It is clear from the earlier discussion that Estonia, at least as far as official 
statements go, is determined to gain admission to NATO. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
MAP established five basic issue areas that potential members must satisfy in order to 
meet minimum requirements for membership. These issue areas are political and 
economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal. This section of the thesis will 
examine the policy choices made by Estonia in each of these areas to determine if NATO 
membership is as important as the government claims. 
1.        Political and Economic Issues 
This issue area offers the largest number of expectations for prospective members 
to demonstrate their compliance with. The eight expectations outlined in this section 
range from concrete, easily demonstrable goals to more abstract expectations that reflect 
a general change in mindset of the aspirant country. In general, conforming to these 
expectations reflects a general respect for the principles embodied in the Washington 
Treaty. For ease of discussion in this thesis, these eight expectations can be grouped into 
63
 European Union, "2000 Regular Report," 87. 
35 
three categories reflecting a candidate's respect for democracy and the rule of law, 
respect for peaceful international relations and respect for the North Atlantic Alliance.64 
a)        Respect for Democracy and theRrule of Law 
Estonia has demonstrated her respect for democracy and the rule of law 
through three mechanisms. The first of these, Estonia's constitution, establishes the 
democratic nature of the government and adherence to the rule of law. For example, 
Chapter 1 of the constitution outlines the general provisions of the government and reads, 
in part, 
• Supreme power of the state is vested in the people 
• The power of the state shall be exercised solely pursuant to the 
Constitution and laws which are in conformity therewith 
• The activities of the Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia), the President of 
the Republic, the Government of the Republic, and the courts shall be 
organized on the principle of separation and balance of powers.65 
Chapter 2 of the constitution describes the fundamental rights, liberties, 
and duties of Estonian citizens, the most important of which in this context are: 
• The rights, liberties and duties of everyone and all persons, as listed in the 
Constitution, shall be equal for Estonian citizens as well as for citizens of 
foreign states and stateless persons who are present in Estonia, and 
• The rights, liberties, and duties enumerated in this Chapter shall not 
preclude other rights, liberties or duties that ensue from the spirit of the 
Constitution or are in accordance therewith and are compatible with 
human dignity and the principles of a society based on social justice, 
democracy, and the rule of law.66 
Chapter 2 also describes the various basic human and legal rights and 
basic freedoms granted to Estonian citizens and people without a state living in Estonia. 
Finally, Chapters 4, 5, and 10 of the Constitution place the armed forces under civilian 
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control by granting the authority to appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense 
Forces, declare war and mobilization and demobilization of military forces to the 
Riigikogu, and naming the President as Supreme Commander of Estonia's Defense 
Forces. 
The second mechanism through which Estonia has demonstrated her 
respect for democracy and the rule of law is the signing and ratification of various 
European conventions. These treaties and conventions include: 
• Convention  for  the  Protection  of Human  Rights  and  Fundamental 
Freedoms and its 11 protocols 
• European Social Charter (revised) 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its protocol 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and its two protocols.67 
In addition to these conventions and treaties, Estonia has taken steps to 
ensure the successful integration of ethnic minorities into Estonian society. The passage 
of a new electoral law and the liberalization of the Law on Citizenship, both of which 
were developed in accordance with OSCE and European Commission recommendations, 
have helped to facilitate the integration of ethnic minorities and stateless persons into 
Estonian society.68 The combination of Estonia's constitution, the signing and ratification 
of these conventions, and the commitment to integration demonstrates a sincere respect 
for democracy and the rule of law. 
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b)        Respect for Peaceful International Relations 
Estonia has demonstrated respect for peaceful international relations 
primarily through her interaction with her neighbors and other European states. Estonia 
has had few international disputes since regaining independence in 1991, and she has 
settled those that occurred peacefully. The majority of Estonia's international disputes 
since regaining independence have been with Russia, the most notable example of which 
concerned the dispute over Russian troops stationed in Estonia at the time of 
independence. This dispute was resolved on 26 July 1994 when Estonian President 
Lennart Meri and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement after more than 
two years of negotiations.69 Although some problem areas remain - such as the status of 
some 10,000 retired Russian soldiers and their families in Estonia - the dispute was 
resolved without resorting to violence. 
Estonia has further demonstrated her respect for peaceful international 
relations through her avid participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Estonia eagerly joined the PfP in March 
1994, and has been a staunch supporter of the program since. Estonian Defense Forces 
participate in more than 200 PfP activities every year, and Estonia hosts several NATO 
activities and activities "in the spirit of PfP" each year. Estonia considers participation in 
the PfP program crucial to security and stability in Europe. At the same time, Estonia 
considers the EAPC as the main forum for cooperation and consultation between NATO 
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and its partners. Estonia participates in NATO and PfP sponsored peacekeeping missions 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania.70 
Finally, Estonia maintains positive relations with her neighbors throughout 
the region. Estonia participates in a number of cooperative military and defense 
enterprises with Latvia and Lithuania, including the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion 
(BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), and the Baltic Defense College 
(BALTDEFCOL). Since regaining independence, Estonia has worked diligently to 
improve relations with Russia through consistent engagement with Moscow on a variety 
of issues. Estonia also maintains good relations with the Nordic countries, and is a 
member of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and an associate member of the 
Nordic Council. Additionally, Estonia has been a member of the Council of Europe since 
1993 and complies fully with the OSCE Code of Conduct and the Vienna Agreement, the 
goal of which is to deepen interstate military security, confidence, and cooperation.71 
c) Respect for the North Atlantic Alliance 
Estonia has demonstrated her respect for the North Atlantic Alliance 
through a number of official statements by government officials, her commitment to the 
principles embodied in the Washington Treaty, and her commitment to ensuring Estonian 
Defense Forces are fully compatible with NATO operating forces. Since 1996, Estonia's 
National Defense Policy has been to construct national defense forces that are capable of 
both independent defense and defense related cooperation with organizations whose 
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objective is to guarantee the security of Europe.72 Estonia has demonstrated through 
participation in peacekeeping missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon 
that she will be a security provider as well as a security consumer.73 Furthermore, Estonia 
understands the need for full and equal disclosure with the Alliance. To highlight this, the 
Estonian Ambassador to NATO stressed Estonia's understanding of the need for not only 
equality in NATO, but also reciprocity with the Alliance - the willingness to allow 
NATO into Estonia's command centers, headquarters, and military staffs.74 Based on 
these efforts, Estonia is committed to being ready to answer NATO's call when the time 
comes. 
2. Defense/Military Issues 
Defense and military issues are the second largest issue area covered by the MAP. 
The expectations outlined in this section are much more concrete than those in the 
political and economic section, and primarily require aspirants to show that their military 
forces are capable of operating with NATO forces in NATO led operations. This 
capability is based both on types of forces and on the interoperability of those forces with 
those of NATO. Estonia's National Security Concept outlines Estonia's support for the 
defense and military issues discussed in this section. 
Estonia supports the new strategic concept outlined at NATO's 1999 50' 
anniversary summit in Washington, and has based her goal of NATO membership on the 
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idea that full integration in the Alliance provides the best way to protect and secure a 
modern democratic state. Estonia continues to be an active participant in both PfP and the 
EAPC, two programs that she sees as an essential part of the integration process. 
Furthermore, Estonia participates in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) as an 
essential means of ensuring her defense forces are equal to the task of operating jointly 
with NATO forces.75 
In addition to providing support for NATO's approach to security as outlined in 
the strategic concept, Estonia is committed to providing capable, modern forces for 
NATO operations. The 2001 Annual National Program (ANP) of Estonia's MAP outlines 
a comprehensive list of goals for the modernization of the Estonian Defense Forces 
(EDF). These goals include the development of rapid reaction capabilities, 
standardization of military education, improvement of working conditions, reorganization 
of the current mobilization system, development of a logistics concept for the EDF, and 
the concentration of officer and NCO training in Estonia.76 The Estonian Ministry of 
Defense introduced this development program in the 2000 ANP with a completion date 
of 2005. To date, the program has met with steady progress. 
3. Resource Issues 
NATO expects aspiring members to commit sufficient budget resources to meet 
the commitments that membership entails. Aspirant's national programs must establish 
the necessary structures to plan and implement defense budgets that meet established 
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defense priorities and allow for NATO familiarization training of national forces.77 
Estonia has enthusiastically supported this aspect of the MAP since 1999, when the 
majority of the political parties in the government reached an agreement in principle to 
increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2002, the date cited at the Washington 
Conference as the time when enlargement would be discussed again.78 Defense spending 
of 2 percent of GDP is generally recognized as the minimum necessary level of defense 
allocation required to meet the requirements of NATO membership. 
Estonia has also taken efforts to improve the state's financial infrastructure to 
better implement this defense spending. The state budget, for example, was rearranged 
toward a goal-oriented budget that had provided for streamlining of resource 
management. Estonia has also instituted an Internal Audit Department in the Ministry of 
Defense to ensure the appropriate expenditure of defense funds. The draft state budget for 
2001 guaranteed full financing for Estonia's commitments to international security, most 
notably her participation in SFOR and KFOR. The draft budget also provided increased 
expenditures of 34 percent for the various Baltic military cooperative projects.79 Because 
Estonia's constitution dictates the maintenance of a balanced budget, these expenditures 
represent a real allocation of real funds.80 
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4.        Security Issues 
NATO expects aspiring members to put in place sufficient safeguards and 
procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in 
NATO's security policy. To facilitate this necessity, NATO provides a number of courses 
to aspiring members on physical, personnel, document, and industrial security and 
information security (INFOSEC).81 Estonia takes security requirements very seriously, 
and started implementing security plans with the 1999 ANP. In May 2000, the NATO 
Office of Security Inspection expressed overall satisfaction with Estonia's security efforts 
to that point. Estonia has additionally adopted a series of basic acts, regulations and 
decrees required by NATO, and submitted the Security Institutions Act to the Riigikogu 
for approval in 2000. Estonia has satisfactorily implemented physical security 
requirements at military installations and, in terms of industrial security, has established a 
list of defense related companies and cleared personnel capable of handling NATO 
classified contracts.82 To date, these efforts have met with NATO's approval. 
5. Legal Issues 
NATO requires aspiring members to examine and become acquainted with the 
appropriate legal agreements that govern cooperation with the Alliance. Aspirants should 
also scrutinize their domestic laws to ensure their compatibility with NATO rules and 
regulations. NATO further expects aspiring members to accede to the various 
international treaties and agreements that define NATO's character and composition.83 
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Estonia has actively pursued the rectification of inconsistencies between domestic law 
and NATO rules and regulations. To this end, the 2000 ANP directed legal efforts toward 
the clarification of civil-military relations, development of a legal framework for 
rendering host-nation support and participation in international peace support operations, 
and the adoption of an amended Peacetime National Defense Act.84 The 2001 ANP 
recognized the accomplishment of these goals as well as the adoption of a new Military 
Service Act, which defines the legal status of military personnel and their social benefits, 
career system, and compulsory military service and the implementation of legal 
arrangements for participation in collective defense.85 Estonia is firmly committed to 
ensuring her domestic laws match NATO's rules and regulations. 
E.        CONCLUSIONS 
Officially, Estonia seeks membership in both the European Union and NATO as 
means to fulfill her quest for security and stability. Membership in the European Union 
would provide necessary economic and political stability that would allow Estonia's 
economic growth to continue and solidify, while membership in NATO would provide 
the necessary "hard" security guarantees that would allow her to direct the spending of 
her national treasure on continued growth of the democratic society she seeks. Officially, 
Estonia's goals seem clear cut, but do her actions match her stated goals? In reality, it is 
difficult to determine Estonia's priorities with regard to accession to the EU and NATO. 
Currently, Estonia is probably much more ready to join NATO than she is to join the EU. 
In part, this is because NATO accession does not require candidates to meet as many 
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stringent requirements as does the EU. At the same time, the bulk of Estonia's efforts are 
currently focused on the adoption of the EU's acquis, as they must be to ensure Estonia is 
ready for accession when the time comes. While both of these arguments are important to 
the question, neither provides a full answer. Indeed, in Estonia's case, the best question 
may not be what are her priorities, but rather what can she achieve? 
The answer to this question is also not entirely clear. Based on her actions and 
decisions over the past several years, Estonia seems likely to be ready to answer NATO's 
call when, and if, it should come for the next round of enlargement. Estonia's eager 
participation in both the EAPC and PfP from the beginning of those programs laid a 
strong groundwork for the future of her defense forces and institutions. Based on this 
foundation, Estonia has outlined plans for the future that would continue to ensure that 
her forces are not only up to the task of defending Estonia, but also of adding to the 
security and stability of the European system. In terms of accession to the EU, Estonia 
faces the difficult challenge of meeting all of the requirements of the acquis. In most 
areas, she has shown strong efforts toward meeting these goals. At the same time, her 
efforts have not been uniform, and in some areas, a large amount of work remains to be 
done. Overall, the European Commission regarded Estonia's efforts as largely 
satisfactory, but her efforts toward the implementation of legislation regarding the 
Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policies, as well as in the area of social and 
labor issues remain well below EU standards, as does the pace of these efforts. These are 
not the only difficulties Estonia faces in implementing the acquis, but they are indicative 
of the problems she faces. 
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The memory of Estonia's historical continuity and her links to Europe run strong 
in the current government, and influence foreign policy decisions just as strongly. In this 
sense, Estonia's foreign policy priorities are security and stability. She sees the EU and 
NATO as complimentary institutions that work together to fulfill this need. In a 1997 
speech to the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik lives argued that 
Estonia sought admission to both institutions because they are not interchangeable. Each 
provides a distinct aspect of security and stability, and having one without the other is not 
acceptable. Membership in the EU provides the stability upon which the military and 
defense guarantees of NATO rest. At the same time, NATO's security guarantees offer 
its members the opportunity to pursue economic growth and prosperity without the need 
to maintain large military forces to defend them alone. Estonia seeks membership in both 
institutions as two sides of the same coin; whether she will be able to achieve both in the 
next round is unlikely, and is, at the least, an open issue. 
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III.    LATVIA'S PRIORITIES FOR WESTERN INTEGRATION 
A.        INTRODUCTION:  WHY WOULD  LATVIA WANT  TO  INTEGRATE 
WITH WESTERN EUROPE? 
Latvia represents a very different case than that of Estonia. Where Estonia's 
experiences as a Soviet republic, and her renewal of independence, were relatively 
peaceful, Latvia had to fight to gain her independence on two occasions and was heavily 
colonized by ethnic Russians during the Soviet period. Consequently, Latvia has had to 
make very different decisions regarding her future in Europe. 
1. Historical Context 
Although Latvia's experiences during the Soviet period, and her part in the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, resemble the experiences of Estonia and Lithuania, 
Latvia's historical experience prior to Soviet domination was unique and provides 
important context for understanding her drive for independence. Starting in the early 
1300s, Latvia was ruled by a succession of foreign powers, culminating in Russia's 
conquering of Latvia during the 1700s.86 By 1900, Latvia had become an important part 
of the Russian Empire as nearly one quarter of all Russian trade passed through Latvian 
ports.87 The outbreak of the First World War dramatically changed Latvia's fortunes, and 
paved the way for her future independence. 
Latvia was essentially a divided territory toward the end of the First World War, 
as the German Army invaded Russia through Latvia. This German military advance 
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displaced more than half of Latvia's population, and most of these refugees eventually 
settled in northeastern Latvia where their huge numbers, including large numbers of 
Latvian Riflemen, provided fertile ground for a growing Bolshevik movement.88 Latvian 
dissidents living under German occupation declared independence for the Latvian state 
on 18 November 1918. Shortly afterward, between December 1918 and January 1919, 
Latvian Bolsheviks seized power throughout Latvia. Bolshevik rule quickly lost public 
support, and lasted only six months.89 Latvian did not achieve independence in practice 
until January 1920 when Polish and Latvian troops cleared the last Communist forces 
from Latvian territory.90 
For all intents and purposes, the independence Latvia achieved in 1920 seemed to 
be a lasting thing. In August ofthat year, Latvia and Russia concluded the Treaty of Riga, 
in which Russia extended de jure status to Latvian independence and renounced 
"voluntarily and for eternal times" all rights over Latvia and her people.91 With Germany 
in disarray following the war, and Russia having renounced her rights to the territory, 
Latvia appeared to be well established in her independence. In fact, Latvian independence 
only lasted until 1940 when Soviet troops, under the auspices of the secret protocols of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, annexed Latvia. Eternity had lasted less than twenty years. 
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Latvia struggled under Soviet domination until the renewal of Latvian 
independence came on 6 September 1991.92 Latvia's return to independence was not 
destined to be as smooth as that of Estonia, however. In January 1991, armed conflict 
erupted between Latvian troops and hostile forces of the "National Salvation Committee" 
and Russian Interior Ministry troops.93 The fighting ended after several weeks, resulting 
in an uneasy peace between Latvian reformers and those forces that sought to keep Latvia 
a part of either the Russian Federation or a revived USSR. The attempted Communist 
coup in Moscow in August 1991 triggered a similar action in Latvia when Russian Army 
and Interior Ministry troops occupied key points in Riga, including radio and television 
studios and government buildings, as part of an attempt to overthrow the fledging Latvian 
government.94 The failure of the coup in Moscow led to the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from the seized buildings and ended Russian attempts to prevent Latvian independence. 
Despite this acquiescence, Russia continued to maintain her troops previously stationed 
on Latvian soil until 1994. 
The differences between Latvia's renewal of independence and that of Estonia 
could hardly be more dramatic. Unlike her neighbor to the north, Latvia was forced to 
fight for her independence on two occasions, in 1918-1920 and again in 1991. This fact 
had a definite impact on Latvia's relations with Russia and on her quest for security and 
stability. History and geography have thus played an important role in the development of 
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Latvia's worldview. Latvian efforts to join the European Union and NATO must be 
viewed in this context. 
2. Inclusion vs. Exclusion 
One of the most important issues Latvian foreign policy has been forced to 
address in the post-Soviet period is the issue of inclusion vs. exclusion, and issue that has 
operated on two levels. On one hand, Latvia sought inclusion in Western Europe through 
membership in NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, Latvia was forced to 
address the issue of integration at home as a prelude to integration with Western Europe. 
Latvia has a checkered past with respect to the integration of national minorities and 
stateless persons. For most of her first period of independence, Latvia supported positive 
treatment for minorities. In fact, during the 1920s and early 1930s, many Russian, Jewish, 
and other refugees fleeing the Soviet Union found refugee in Latvia. This situation 
changed in May 1934 when an authoritarian coup toppled Latvia's elected government 
and instituted restrictions against minority access and rights as a form of defensive 
nationalism to preserve ethnic Latvian dominance.95 
The dilution of Latvia's ethnic population became an issue during the period of 
renewed independence in 1990. The basis of this issue had to do with the effects of 
Soviet Russification efforts during the period of Soviet domination. Latvia's native 
population declined by 20 percent during the period from 1939 to 1989 to just over half 
of the total population. During the same period, Latvia's Russian population increased 
from one-tenth of the total population to one-third.96 This dilution of ethnic Latvians and 
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corresponding growth in the percentage of Russians posed a problem as Latvians debated 
the nature of citizenship in the newly independent republic. At issue was the definition of 
Latvia's statehood: was Latvia a new state proclaimed in 1990 or a continuation of the 
state proclaimed in 1918? Latvia's "Citizen's Committees," radical nationalist groups, 
concluded that Latvian independence in 1990 was a renewal of the statehood proclaimed 
in 1918, and that citizenship in 1990 should be based on those Latvians who had been 
citizens at the time of Soviet annexation.97 In contrast, in July 1989, the Latvian Popular 
Front, a more liberal independence movement, had advocated citizenship for all residents 
of Latvia, regardless of nationality, social situation, or religious affiliation, who chose to 
support Latvia's return to independence, and who had lived in Latvia for more than ten 
years.98 The Citizen's Committees eventually won out, and Latvia's initial citizenship 
laws emphasized the continuity of citizenship with the continuity of statehood. Once 
again, a form of defensive nationalism had set in, for which Latvia was roundly criticized 
by Russia and the West. Although she eventually amended her citizenship laws to meet 
international standards, Latvia's history had already played an important role in her new 
period of independence. As the decade of the 1990s progressed, Latvian leaders came to 
realize that Latvia's strength lay in including every member of her population in society. 
Ethnic Latvians no longer made up a large enough proportion of the population to be able 
126. 
97
 The "parliament" formed by the Citizen's Committee was very similar to the types of alternative 
parliaments enacted under the "Congress of Estonia" during the same period. These parliaments were 
extremely nationalist and determined to preserve the inherent rights of the ethnic majority at any cost. 
98
 In 1990, the Popular Front emphasized the importance of avoiding the "arrogance of one nation 
over another," as well as the need to avoid chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and Russophobia. Smith, "The 
Resurgence of Nationalism," 184-185. 
51 
to act unilaterally. A prosperous future for all Latvians, regardless of their ethnicity or 
place of birth, could only be assured through the inclusion of all elements into the state. 
The issue of inclusion vs. exclusion is the most important factor to understanding 
Latvia's priorities for integration with Western Europe. Inclusion and integration are 
factors in nearly every assessment of Latvia's domestic and foreign policies. The 
importance of inclusion at home, and with Europe as a whole, is so important, it is 
codified in the 1997 National Security Concept. This document describes, in part, the 
importance of social integration in Latvia to eliminate socially destabilizing activities, 
any pretext for foreign intervention to protect the rights of ethnic minorities, and to 
ensure all residents' interest in Latvia's national permanence." 
B.        LATVIA'S STATED PRIORITIES WITH REGARD TO NATO AND EU 
ACCESSION 
Latvia strongly desires integration with Western Europe. Latvia views virtually 
every delay in achieving membership in these institutions as a major setback that poses a 
grave risk to both Latvian security, Baltic security, and the security of Europe as a whole. 
Based on this discussion, it is possible to examine Latvia's stated priorities with respect 
to integration with the EU and NATO. Like Estonia, Latvia is a member of a number of 
European institutions including the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO's 
Partnership for Peace program, as well as being an Associate Partner of the WEU. While 
these organizations are important, and Latvia has especially taken great pride in her 
recent presidency of the Council of Europe, they are not enough to give Latvia the sense 
99
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of inclusion she seeks. To achieve this goal, Latvia is pursuing membership in the EU 
and NATO. 
Essentially, Latvia seeks membership in the EU and NATO as a means to ensure 
her inclusion in Western Europe, and through that inclusion, ensure her security. In a 
1996 speech, Foreign Minister Dr. Valdis Birkavs expressed concern that failure by 
Latvia to gain admission to the EU and NATO would cause severe destabilization in 
Latvia's security environment. In the same speech, Birkavs argued that Latvia should not 
view either the EU or NATO as alternatives to one another. Instead, the EU and NATO 
are complimentary and mutually reinforcing directions of Latvia's foreign and security 
policy. The means established to achieve membership in both the EU and NATO are the 
strengthening of her statehood, consolidating the nation, bringing order to social and 
economic relations, and maintaining good neighborly relations. 100 Latvia understands 
that the efforts taken to meet the membership requirements can be just as important as 
actually gaining admission. 101 
As outlined in a January 1998 speech by Guntis Ulmanis, President of the 
Republic of Latvia, there are four pillars in the formation of Latvian security: 
• Strong Latvian society, 
• Strong Baltic Sea region, including Russia, 
• Strong Europe, and 
• Strong Atlanticism 102 
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For Latvia, inclusion in Western Europe is the only way to guarantee her security. 
Indeed, Latvia believes that the key to overall European security and stability is 
dependent on the integration of all European states. Dividing lines and gray zones, such 
as were prominent throughout the twentieth century, must be avoided at all costs. 103 
Latvia's efforts to "go it alone" failed miserably in the past, and she hopes to be able to 
join the EU and NATO to ensure her future. As Foreign Minister Birkavs said at a 1997 
conference in Helsinki, "Why sit on the sidelines and have the game decided by 
others?"i04 The obvious question is what does Latvia hope to gain by getting into the 
game. 
The chief goal of Latvian foreign policy is to firmly root Latvia in Europe at all 
levels, to include social, cultural, economic, political, and military. 105 Latvia views 
Europe as a community of nations who share common values, such as democracy, respect 
for the rule of law, free market economics, and respect for human rights. 106 Latvia sees 
the European Union as the path to ensuring her status as a modern European state in 
social, cultural, economic, and political terms. In a statement at the opening of Latvia's 
accession negotiations with the EU in 2000, Latvia's Foreign Minister, Indulis Berzins, 
argued EU membership was the best way to support Latvia's national interests, support 
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the development of democracy, protect her language and culture, and reinforce her 
sovereignty. 107 
For Latvia, successful integration and inclusion at home will lead to integration 
and inclusion in Western Europe. Latvia's integration into Europe requires the 
consolidation of an inclusive society in Latvia, a society in which any person loyal to 
Latvia, regardless of their origin, will feel welcome. 108 In a July 1998 statement, then 
Foreign Minister Birkavs laid the groundwork for this idea, saying, "We understand in 
Latvia that security at home is the foundation for international security."i09 To achieve 
this goal of a tolerant, educated, and integrated society that would lead to Latvia's 
integration in Europe, Foreign Minister Berzins articulated three tools, hereafter referred 
to as the "October Tools:" sustainable economic development, promotion of common 
values, and cultural pluralism and diversity. 110 Integration thus plays an important role in 
Latvia's policies, and is a goal for both her foreign and domestic policies. 
Latvia's priorities with respect to NATO membership follow along the lines of 
her priorities for EU membership. Latvia regards NATO as an organization that provides 
stability and predictability; just the sort of situation a state needs to consolidate its 
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modernization efforts. 111 Latvia desires to join NATO to provide the hard security 
guarantees that will allow her modernization and integration efforts to continue 
unimpeded. Indeed, Latvia believes that only NATO membership will assure her that 
every security challenge will be addressed collectively with like-minded countries. 112 
NATO membership is thus an additional means to achieve the end goal of integration and 
inclusion, both at home and abroad. Foreign Minister Berzins articulated this issue the 
best during a November 1999 address: "The EU with its strengthening of home and 
justice affairs and the hardened security of NATO.. .this is the right combination for 
Latvia."i 13 NATO's hard security guarantees will provide the necessary stability for 
Latvia to pursue integration and inclusion with the EU. 
C.        INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Latvia views EU integration as vitally important to her future. A 1995 statement 
from the Latvian parliament, the Saeima, argued that EU accession was an opportunity 
vital to the survival of the Latvian state and people. Furthermore, it argued, economic 
alignment with the EU was bound to promote faster development of Latvia's economy 
and culture. Consequently, the statement defined accession to the EU as a strategic aim of 
Latvian foreign policy.114 In order to examine Latvia's priority for EU integration, this 
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1,2
 "We must avoid the arrangements, be it regional pacts or semi-alliances...which bring a risk of 
fragmentation and isolation of the Baltic States from the integration processes taking place in Europe." - 
Dr. Valdis Birkavs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, "How Secure are the Baltic 
States?" Conference organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Latvian Institute of 




 Indulis Berzins, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia, "Regional Security in the New 
Europe: The Impact of Kosovo and the Enlargement of European Institutions," address at the Fourth 





 Republic of Latvia, "Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Latvia on Agenda 2000 
56 
section will look at Latvia's efforts with respect to meeting the EU accession 
requirements in the context of the "October Tools": sustainable economic development, 
promotion of common values, and cultural pluralism and diversity. 
Latvia's relationship with the EU has been slightly different from that of Estonia 
given that Latvia did not begin formal accession negotiations until February 2000. 
Although formal negotiations did not begin until 2000, the December 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council Summit allowed the next group of accession candidates, which 
included Latvia, to proceed with accession plans so they would be at the highest level of 
readiness when formal negotiations did commence. Based on this plan, the EU produced 
the same progress reports on Latvia as it did for Estonia. This section will examine how 
Latvia's policy decisions mesh with the requirements for EU membership. These 
requirements were outlined in the first chapter, and this section will use the same 
methodology as that used in Chapter Two, "Estonia's Priorities for Integration," with a 
specific emphasis placed on those efforts related to integration and inclusion. 
1.        Political Criteria 
Latvia faced significant difficulties in establishing her first independent post- 
Soviet era government. Faced with armed intervention by Russian military and Interior 
Ministry forces, it took nearly a year and a half after her declaration of independence for 
Latvia's newest democratic government to govern independently. The decline of the 
percentage of the Latvian majority population, coupled with Russia's attempts to disrupt 
the independence process, led to defensive actions by the Latvian government. One such 
- European Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the European Union." 
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57 
act was the restoration of the 1922 State Constitution, with minor changes. The most 
severe act, however, was the first post-independence citizenship law, which was 
extremely strict and cut all non-Latvians out of political and, to a certain extent, 
economic arenas.115 Latvia eventually amended the law to include all residents who met 
basic residence requirements, but the turmoil over the question of citizenship is indicative 
of Latvia's efforts to meet the political criteria for EU accession. 
The 1997 European Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for 
Membership of the EU gave Latvia passing marks in terms of meeting the political 
criteria. The opinion noted that Latvia's political institutions functioned properly and 
under stable conditions. Latvia, it reported, demonstrated the characteristics of a 
democracy, with stable institutions that guaranteed the rule of law and human rights. At 
the same time, the Commission noted several areas in need of improvement to ensure that 
Latvia continued to meet the political criteria. The areas indicated by the Commission, 
and those of direct importance to Foreign Minister Berzins' tools, are: 
• Efforts to improve the operation of the judicial system and intensify the fight 
against corruption, 
• Measures necessary to streamline and simplify the naturalization process to 
enable non-citizens to better integrate into society, and 
• Measures to ensure equal rights for non-citizens and ethnic minorities116 
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The deficiencies noted in naturalization and equality of rights for non-citizens were 
particularly surprising given Latvia's recognition in her 1997 National Security Concept 
of the need for social integration. 
'ö* 
Specific deficiencies noted in each of these areas are as follows. With respect to 
the judicial system, the Commission noted deficiencies in implementing and enforcing 
decisions taken by the courts. With respect to the naturalization process, the Commission 
recommended amending the Citizenship Law to remove the "windows" for 
naturalization. These windows only allowed a very limited number of non-citizens to 
apply for naturalization in any given year, and these were normally subject to minimum 
age requirements for that year. The effect was that few non-citizens were applying for 
naturalization. With respect to equality of rights for non-citizens and national minorities, 
the Commission noted that non-citizens were denied some fundamental rights and were 
barred from owning property and holding certain jobs.117 
The European Commission's 1998 Regular Report on Latvia's progress toward 
accession did note some progress in the trouble areas noted in the 1997 Commission 
Opinion. For example, the Regular Report recognized the implementation of reforms, 
such as a basic framework for the reform of the institute of court bailiffs, designed to 
improve enforcement and implementation of court decisions, but also noted the need for 
improved judicial salaries and training and administration of the courts.118 The 
Citizenship Law was amended to make naturalization easier and more accessible through 
117
 EU, "Agenda 2000." 
118
 European Union, "1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress towards 
Accession," 9. Available [online]: 
htrp:/.'www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report 11 98/en/latvia en.doc 
59 
the elimination of the windows system, the granting of citizenship to stateless children at 
birth, and the easing of naturalization requirements for those over the age of 65.'19 
Efforts to improve equality among non-citizens and ethnic minorities included the 
January 1998 promulgation of a new Amnesty Law that put citizens and non-citizens on 
equal footing, the April 1998 abolition of restrictions on non-citizens holding most jobs, 
with a government pledge to abolish the remaining restrictions, and the May 1998 
amendment to the unemployment regulations removing the requirement for job seekers to 
provide proof of their knowledge of Latvian. At the same time, the Commission noted the 
need for reinforcement in the draft Language Law to ensure its applicability and fairness 
for the whole population.120 
The Commission's 1999 Regular Report noted even further progress by Latvia in 
meeting the deficiencies noted by previous reports. Greater strides in judicial reform 
occurred with the establishment of a Disciplinary Board of Judges and a Judicial 
Qualification Board for more objective evaluation of judges and the granting of judicial 
qualification degrees, respectively. Additionally, basic salaries increased and voluntary 
judicial training became available. The March 1999 Law on Civil Procedure improved 
the functioning of the courts system, while the November 1999 Penitentiary Law 
improved, in particular, the mechanisms for carrying out sentences. The Commission 
noted the need for the proposed framework on the institute of court bailiffs to be 
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approved and the need to reduce the backlog of cases and improve the judicial 
infrastructure.121 
With respect to naturalization of non-citizens, the Commission noted dramatic 
increases in both the numbers of applications and the numbers of approvals for 
naturalization. By the end of 1999, Latvia met all of the OSCE's requirements regarding 
naturalization procedures. The framework document of the national program for "The 
Integration of Society in Latvia" was debated in public forum between March and May 
1999, and was scheduled to be submitted to the government by the end of the year. In 
addition, schools had until August 1999 to choose one of four bi-lingual teaching 
methods outlined in the 1998 Education Law. Deficiencies noted included the need to 
amend the 1999 Language Law to bring it in line with European norms and a review of 
those professions from which non-citizens continued to be barred.122 
The 2000 Regular Report noted continued progress toward the full 
implementation of the political criteria, as well as noting areas for further efforts. In terms 
of the judicial system, the Commission commented favorably on a number of structural 
changes designed to streamline the effectiveness of the courts. At the same time, the 
Commission did recognize several glaring errors in need of immediate attention. These 
problem areas included the need for passage of the proposed legislation on court bailiffs 
(again), the need for a Law on Criminal Procedure comparable to the Law on Civil 
Procedure passed in 1999, and the need for expanded judicial training. All of these efforts 
121
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would further increase the efficiency of the courts and improve the execution of 
sentences.123 
With respect to naturalization and integration, the Commission noted a continued 
decline in the numbers of non-citizens since the amendment of the naturalization 
procedures. In addition, the national program for integration of Latvian society was 
adopted in December 1999. Latvia amended the 1999 Language Law to bring it in line 
with European norms as of September 2000. Despite these efforts, some problems still 
remained in terms of integrating non-citizens. For example, the government failed to 
conduct its self-appointed review of the remaining professions from which non-citizens 
were barred.124 
2. Economic Criteria 
Latvia's position on the Baltic Sea, and her access to ice-free ports, has made her 
an important economic power throughout her history. Whether as a member of the 
Hanseatic League in the 15th century or as a major transshipment point for Russian trade 
during the 19' and 20th centuries, Latvia has consistently played an important role in the 
economic sphere of the region. In the interwar period, Latvia was able to build a thriving 
economy without having to accept large amounts of foreign aid and accrued little debt in 
doing so. The large amounts of gold bouillon deposited in Western banks during this 
period attest to the solvency of the Latvian economy and form the basis for the current 
123
 European Union, "2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress towards 
Accession," 16-18. Available [online]: 
http:,'/www.europa.eu.int/comni/enlargement-/dwn//report  11  OO/pdfien/Iv en.pdf 
124
 EU, "2000 Regular Report," 22, 23. 
62 
monetary stability of the Latvian currency.125 This period of economic well being ceased 
immediately upon annexation by the Soviet Union, but Latvia has been able to regain 
some of her former economic glory since regaining her independence. This is not to say 
that Latvia has not encountered difficulties on her climb back to a market oriented 
economy. To the contrary, the Soviet period left Latvia ill-equipped to function in a 
modern market economy. The combined tasks of rebuilding the instruments of state 
power and rebuilding a market economy have hindered the success of both efforts, with 
the result, in terms of economics, being slow restoration of market oriented economic 
structures. For example, Latvia liberalized foreign trade, interest rates, and wages 
immediately upon regaining independence, but the pace of privatization of industry and 
businesses has progressed much more slowly. This section will focus on Latvia's efforts 
in all of these areas to meet the economic criteria of the EU accession requirements, and 
specifically on those areas of greatest importance to Foreign Minister Berzins' tool of 
sustained economic development. 
The European Commission's 1997 Opinion on Latvia's Application for 
membership of the EU met with mixed results in evaluating Latvia's fitness to meet the 
economic criteria of the accession process. The Commission found that Latvia had made 
substantial progress toward the development of a functioning market economy. Prices 
and trade had been liberalized for the most part, but market access for new and foreign 
firms was hampered by deficient legislation and red tape, and the privatization process 
was proceeding too slowly. Other areas of concern for the Commission included the lack 
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of regulatory bodies to ensure fair market competition, a weak banking system, and a 
limited tax base and poor tax collection procedures.126 
In terms of the ability to cope with market pressures in the EU, the Commission 
found Latvia severely wanting. The Commission determined Latvia would face serious 
difficulties in trying to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the 
EU in the medium term. Despite the existence of a functioning market economy, the 
economy as a whole was simply too weak. The Commission noted that opening up the 
Latvian economy to competition in the early 1990s exposed its weakness and underlined 
the need for restructuring of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Much of Latvia's 
competitiveness and ability to export goods was founded on her low wage levels, but 
most of her export goods were low value-added items. Thus, Latvia could produce goods 
relatively cheaply, but those goods were essentially viewed as being of inferior quality. In 
terms of foreign trade, the EU accounted for one-half of Latvian imports and less than 
one-half of Latvian exports, while Russia remained Latvia's number one trading 
partner.127 In short, Latvia possessed some, but not all, of the qualities necessary for 
sustained economic development. 
The Commission's 1998 Regular Report found that Latvia had mad some 
progress toward improving her economic outlook since 1997. The crowning achievement 
was Latvia's acceptance into the World Trade Organization in October 1998, but overall 
the Commission noted Latvia was well on her way to being able to cope with competitive 
pressures in the EU and continued to make solid progress in the consolidation of the 
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market economy. Areas of improvement recognized by the Commission included the 
establishment of a Competition Council and a Competition Board to regulate fair 
economic competition, strengthening of the banking sector, increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and increased trade with the EU. Areas in need of improvement 
included further privatization of state-owned enterprises, the need for legislation to fill 
holes in the regulatory framework, greater investment in the country's infrastructure, and 
a widening of the trade base.128 Overall, Latvia made progress in 1998, but much more 
work needed to be done to be able to create sustainable economic development. 
Latvia's strong trade links with the Russian Federation produced an economic 
downturn in Latvia in the wake of the August 1998 Russian financial collapse. 
Consequently, the outlook for 1999 was not as favorable as the previous year's. The 1999 
Regular Report noted a deceleration in growth of Latvia's GDP in the last half of 1998, 
an increase in unemployment, and an increase in the trade deficit as exports to the EU far 
outstripped exports to the Russian Federation. The 1999 Regular Report did not contain 
only bad news however. The Commission did recognize increased export levels to the EU 
with the result of gradually widening Latvia's trade base, the drawing to a close of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and an increase in regulatory legislation to 
strengthen the financial sector in the wake of the Russian financial collapse.129 In order to 
ensure continued positive progress in the economic arena, the Commission recommended 
increased investment in the infrastructure, greater skill diversification for laborers, 
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continued privatization, and the removal of any remaining legal roadblocks to private 
enterprise development and investment.130 
The European Commission's 2000 Regular Report represented Latvia's first 
official assessment with respect to accession negotiations. The report was essentially 
rosy, but the Commission did note several areas that required action to ensure continued 
progress toward integration with the EU. These areas primarily focused on the market 
economy and the need for improved access to it. Latvia had made great strides in this 
area since the 1997 Opinion, but greater efforts were still required. For example, 
privatization of the remaining state-owned enterprises, progress on which had not been 
achieved since 1998, was noted as a glaring need. Additionally, the Commission noted 
the need for improved access to the market by domestic private and foreign enterprises 
and the need for increased public and private investment in the economy.131 Overall, 
however, Latvia has made significant strides toward producing an environment 
conducive to producing sustainable economic growth. 
3. Ability to Assume the Obligations of Membership 
The EU acquis is the most complex portion of the accession negotiation process, 
and the portion that requires the most effort by candidate countries to fulfill. Latvia is no 
different than other candidates in this respect, as the European Commission noted both 
positive and negative aspects of Latvia's likelihood to be ready to assume these 
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discussion of Latvia's priorities. Those areas that are most relevant, however, are as 
follows: 
• The Four Freedoms (Free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons), 
• Sectoral Policies, specifically industrial, agricultural, and small- and medium- 
sized enterprises (SMEs), and 
• Economic and Social Cohesion 
There are possibly other areas that directly or indirectly address the tools outlined by 
Foreign Minister Berzins, but those areas listed above are the most relevant to this 
discussion. 
a) The Four Freedoms 
The 1997 Commission Opinion found Latvia had created or was in the 
process of creating the most important directives necessary for the regulation of a market 
economy. The report noted the need for further legislative efforts regarding public 
procurement and intellectual an industrial property rights.132 In terms of the free 
movement of goods, Latvia adopted laws regarding technical barriers to trade in 1996, 
and by 1997 had already introduced liberal price, trade, and foreign exchange regimes 
and established the necessary basic legal and commercial rules regarding movement of 
goods across borders.133 By 1997, Latvia had abolished nearly all restrictions on the free 
movement of capital, restrictions on foreign purchases of land and industries were 
significantly loosened, and the state was well on its way to full harmonization of banking 
legislation with the EU.134 Greater efforts were required with respect to the free 
movement of persons. 
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The Commission's 1998 Regular Report noted satisfactory progress in all 
of these areas. In terms of the free movement of goods, Latvia continued to make 
progress in drafting and implementing legislation governing this area. The report defined 
the main area for future improvement as increasing the technical and financial 
participation of Latvian industries in standardization activities.135 Little change was made 
in 1998 in the area of free movement of capital, although in the area of free movement of 
services, Latvia continued to make great strides in the harmonization of her banking 
legislation with that of the EU. Finally, Latvia adopted no significant new legislation with 
respect to the free movement of persons in 1998. The Commission noted the need for 
improved enforcement of legislation in nearly all areas as the primary area of concern 
regarding the Four Freedoms.136 
The 1999 Regular Report recognized Latvia's continued efforts in the area 
of the Four Freedoms. In terms of the free movement of goods, the report noted Latvia 
had successfully implemented the basic principles for standardization (transparency, 
consensus, voluntary participation, and wide participation) following the adoption of the 
Law on Standardization in December 1998. Latvia also continued to make progress with 
regard to implementation capacity with the establishment of several independent 
institutions focused on this capacity.137 In terms of the free movement of capital, Latvia 
also made excellent progress in 1999. The only significant remaining restrictions were in 
direct investment in certain types of companies and acquisition of land by foreign 
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nationals and certain types of companies.138 With respect to the free movement of 
services, Latvia continued in 1999 to implement legislation in accordance with the acquis 
and EU norms. Finally, Latvia failed to adopt necessary legislation concerning the free 
movement of persons in 1999. 
The 2000 Regular Report recognized Latvia's continued progress in the 
area of the Four Freedoms. Specifically, Latvia continued to align legislation with respect 
to the free movement of goods with the EU acquis, and strengthened administrative 
structures such as the standardization bodies.139 In terms of the free movement of capital, 
Latvia's legislation and policies were largely in alignment with the acquis. Areas of 
concern continued to be isolated restrictions on foreign investors, and certain forms of 
investment in the security sector and foreign assets.140 With respect to the free movement 
of services, Latvia continued to be in accordance with the acquis with regard to the 
banking sector, but the Commission noted the need for improvements in aligning 
insurance legislation with that of the acquis. Finally, Latvia continued her failure to make 
any progress with respect to the free movement of persons, a somewhat ironic occurrence 
given her stated desires for integration and inclusion. 
b)        Sectoral Policies 
(1) Industry. At the time of the 1997 Commission Opinion, 
Latvia had been successful in restructuring her inherited industrial base to meet the needs 
of a modem market economy. At that time, Latvian industry focused primarily on low- 
value added labor intensive sectors such as food processing, construction, forestry, and 
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clothing; areas that were successful in integrating with the EU market and in securing 
competitive advantages with Russia and the other CIS countries.141 The most pressing 
needs for the future, as noted by the Commission, were strengthened measures to foster 
domestic capital formation and foreign direct investment.142 
The 1998 Regular Report recognized satisfactory improvements 
over the previous year. For example, 1998 saw increased industrial output, exports of 
industrial products, labor productivity, and the volume of productive investments to the 
manufacturing sector. In order to capitalize on these gains, enlarge the export base, and 
increase productivity, the Regular Report recommended maintaining foreign direct 
investment levels, increased allocation of resources to education and labor market 
policies, and transferring responsibility for EU-compatibility of products to the industries 
to allow them to gain skills necessary for competition on the open market.143 
The impact of the 1998 Russian financial crisis on Latvian industry 
caused the government to place greater emphasis on industrial analysis, defining 
competitive advantages, identification of market failures, and increased involvement of 
industrialists, universities and centers of excellence in the industrial sector. Latvia 
recognized the need for government support for this sector in conjunction with a healthy 
respect for the free market. Additionally, the Russian crisis forced Latvia to recognize the 
need for increased research and development and upgrading professional skills of 
workers. Finally, the aftermath of the crisis highlighted a larger number of barriers to 
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investment than had been previously recognized.144 Latvia undertook efforts to address 
these issues. 
Latvia primarily focused on investment promotion during 2000. 
For example, Latvia continued efforts to remove barriers to foreign investment and to 
provide foreign investors with incentives to invest in Latvian industry. Privatization and 
restructuring continued to proceed, albeit at a much slower pace than previously. 
Additionally, privatization and promotion of investment failed to produce the expected 
in-depth restructuring of the sector Latvian officials expected.145 Latvia made little 
progress in expanding the export base beyond the low-value added products that have 
been the staple of Latvian industry since regaining independence. The sector had likely 
failed to completely recover from the 1998 financial crisis. 
(2) Agriculture. Latvia's agricultural sector, like that of 
Estonia, has faced significant problems since regaining independence. In 1997, although 
land reform and privatization were largely completed, Latvia's lack of a functioning land 
market and the complete absence of any policies similar to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) hampered adjustment in this sector. The Commission recommended 
Latvia's primary goals in this sector should be focused on strengthening the 
administrative structures necessary to implement and enforce the policy instruments of 
the CAP.146 
The 1998 Regular Report noted some progress in this area since 
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the previous year. Structural adjustments of the sector continued to be hampered by lack 
of a developed land market, although privatization and land reform did continue to 
proceed at a satisfactory pace. The Commission noted the need for further legislative 
efforts to strengthen Latvia's administrative capacity to implement the CAP.147 
In 1999, Latvia spent more than half of the agricultural budget on 
programs for increased Sectoral and rural development. Among the effects of these 
programs were direct payment of agricultural subsidies and direct input support to the 
sector. Unrelated to these efforts, but of equal importance, was the failure of the land 
market to develop as quickly as expected. Finally, Latvia made little progress in 
developing the necessary mechanisms for the implementation of the CAP.148 Overall, 
1999 was a year of mixed results for the agricultural sector. 
No significant changes occurred in Latvia's agricultural policy in 
2000. Having said that, the 2000 Regular Report did note that Latvia did make some 
progress in implementing EU requirements and mechanisms for a limited number of 
agricultural products, to include quality standards for some specialty products and 
continued government intervention.149 Whether this represented an attempt to develop 
the mechanisms necessary to implement the CAP was unclear. Further efforts in 
developing the administrative structures for the successful implementation of the CAP 
continued to be needed. 
(3) Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The 
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number of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) grew substantially in Latvia 
starting in the mid-1980s. By 1997, the economy had become very friendly to SMEs, but 
still required some improvements. The Commission recommended strengthening support 
infrastructures, improving the tax environment, and providing better access to financing 
for SMEs to accomplish this goal. 
Latvia established a network of business advisory centers in 1998 
to support SME development. Additionally, Latvia established a number of business 
innovation centers to promote the transfer of new technologies and provide support to 
technology-based SMEs.150 
Latvia's efforts in the SME sector had begun to pay large 
dividends by the printing og the 2000 Regular Report. By 2000, SMEs employed 
approximately 65 percent of the active population and produced about one-half of 
Latvia's GDP.151 With this successful groundwork laid, the Commission recommended 
Latvia turn her attention in this sector to the implementation of legislation and programs 
designed to increase education and training in management skills necessary for long-term 
success in this sector. In addition, the Commission recommended Latvia act to further 
strengthen the administrative and implementation bodies, which were too fragmented, 
developed to guide this sector in order to ensure a smooth transition to the common 
market.152 
(4) Economic and Social Cohesion. By 1997, Latvia was 
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pursuing efforts to bring her labor laws in line with EU norms, and to address 
deficiencies in equal opportunity legislation and social security for migrant workers.153 
There was little change in this area in 1998. The 1999 Regular Report expressed serious 
doubts as to whether Latvia would be able to enforce this part of the acquis once it was 
officially adopted. Although Latvia adopted some new legislation in 1999 with respect to 
equal opportunity and health and safety at work, the Commission recommended further 
efforts and the need to strengthen all institutions in this area of the acquis.154 
The Commission's 2000 Regular Report primarily identified areas 
in need of improvement in the area of Economic and Social Cohesion. The Commission 
did note progress in the areas of health and safety and equal opportunity, with new 
legislation adopted in January and February 2000 respectively. In contrast, the report 
noted the need for reformed legislation with respect to labor laws, specifically the 
adoption of a new Labor Code.155 In addition, the report recommended efforts to address 
the high unemployment rate, which stood at approximately 14.5 percent. The 
Commission remarked that while Latvia's legislation and regulatory bodies in this area 
were only partially in line with the acquis, large deficiencies would be addressed through 
the adoption of the proposed legislation.156 
D.        INTEGRATION WITH NATO 
Latvia's history of involvement with NATO goes back to the restoration of 
independence in 1990. Latvia participated in the first meeting of the North Atlantic 
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Cooperation Council in December 1991, signed the Partnership for Peace founding 
document in February 1994, joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995, 
and officially became a candidate for enlargement in April 1999.157 Latvia views NATO 
as one link in a greater chain to integrate all of Europe as a secure and stable community. 
For Latvia, accession to NATO means more than just joining an integrated military 
organization or participating in peacekeeping operations. NATO membership means 
becoming an active partner in the historic process of building a Europe free of artificial 
borders and unfounded divisions.158 Latvia is committed to becoming a full member of 
NATO. As outlined in chapter one, NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) outlines 
five basic issue areas that candidate countries must satisfy in order to fulfill the Alliance's 
membership requirements. 
1.        Political and Economic Issues 
This discussion of Latvia's efforts to fulfill the requirements of this issue area will 
follow the convention outlined in chapter two, i.e., this area will be examined in terms of 
Latvia's respect for democracy and the rule of law, respect for peaceful international 
relations, and respect for the North Atlantic Alliance. 
a)        Respect for Democracy and the Rule of Law 
The basis of Latvia's democratic government, like that of Estonia, is 
rooted in her constitution.  Chapter I of the constitution states that Latvia is an 
independent democratic republic, and that the sovereign power of the Latvian State is 
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vested in the Latvian people. Democratic control of the armed forces is enshrined in 
Chapter III of the constitution, which  designates the President of Latvia as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian armed forces, grants him the authority to declare 
war, based on a decision by the Saeima, and the authority to take "whatever steps are 
necessary"  for the military defense of the  state.159 Chapter VIII  of the Latvian 
constitution defines the fundamental human rights of all human beings in Latvia, 
regardless of citizenship or country of origin. Indeed, the constitution states human rights 
shall be realized without discrimination of any kind. Chapter VI of the constitution 
directs that judges shall be independent and subject only to the law. Chapter VI also 
establishes a Constitutional Court, the purpose of which is to determine the compliance of 
legislation with the constitution.160 Latvia's constitution essentially establishes a system 
of checks and balances between the various branches of the government, a system that is 
very similar to the US system. Given the United States' dominant position in NATO, a 
better system would be difficult to find. 
b) Respect for Peaceful International Relations 
Latvia's history has by no means been a peaceful one. Although she faced 
violent attempts to prevent her independence in 1991, Latvia has staunchly supported 
peaceful relations with her neighbors and all nations. Indeed, Latvia's efforts to integrate 
with Western Europe are driven by a search for stability, not fear of any specific 
threat.161 Latvia regards friendly relations as being important on a number of levels, to 
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include regional, continental, and transatlantic. Latvia has established defense 
cooperation agreements with 30 countries, and has signed bilateral agreements on 
military cooperation with 18 countries. Additionally, despite her troubled past with 
Russia, Latvia advocates peaceful relations with Russia and actively engaging her giant 
neighbor in order to improve those relations. For example, Latvia is a strong supporter of 
the EU's Northern Dimension and NATO's Founding Act with Russia because both 
programs attempt to engage Russia in constructive dialog and assuage Russian fears. 
Latvia's strong support for her trilateral relations with the other two Baltic republics and 
her active participation in wider regional organizations, such as the Council for Baltic Sea 
States, are further examples of her desire for peaceful international relations. 
An excellent example of Latvia's commitment to peaceful international 
relations is the negotiations regarding Russian forces stationed on Latvian soil following 
the renewal of independence in 1991. Russia used these forces, and others transported 
from Russia, in attempts to prevent Latvian independence in 1991. Despite this unhappy 
history, Latvia negotiated with Russia in an open manner regarding the status of the 
Russian radar facility at Skrunda, and allowed the site to remain operational until Aug 
1998 with an additional 18 months to disassemble it. Given her history of foreign 
occupation, and more recent history of Russian intransigence, Latvia could have counted 
on international support in efforts to immediately remove the Skrunda site. Instead, she 
chose to work with Russia to achieve a peaceful solution. 
c) Respect for the North Atlantic Alliance 
Latvia has demonstrated her respect for the North Atlantic Alliance 
primarily through her commitment to the principles embodied in the Washington Treaty 
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and her commitment to ensuring Latvian National Armed Forces are fully compatible 
with NATO operating forces. Latvia's National Defense Concept dictates that Latvia will 
develop her defense system to be fully interoperable with NATO.162 Like Estonia, Latvia 
has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, through her participation in 
peacekeeping missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania that she is ready 
and able to contribute to the overall security of the continent. Finally, Latvia recognizes 
the need to understand the Alliance as much as possible, at all levels. Her avid 
participation in Partnership for Peace, the EAPC, the Planning and Review Process, and 
the Personnel Staff Element (PSE) program, which allows partner countries to station 
officers from national armed forces at NATO headquarters for familiarization and 
integration, show Latvia's keen interest in everything that NATO entails. Latvia is deeply 
committed to being ready to answer NATO's call whenever it may come. 
2. Defense/Military Issues 
Latvia is committed to military and defense cooperation with NATO. Latvia's 
goal of NATO accession is predicated on her belief that membership on the Alliance is 
the most effective way to ensure the continuity of Latvian sovereignty and contribute to 
the promotion of stability throughout Europe.163 In support of this goal, Latvia has 
worked diligently since regaining independence to ensure her armed forces are of 
sufficient caliber to operate with NATO forces. Latvia's forces gained important "real- 
world" experience and demonstrated their ability to operate with NATO forces through 
their participation in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, 
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AFOR in Albania, and OSCE-led observer mission throughout the Balkan region. In 
addition, Latvia has been an enthusiastic participant in the Partnership for Peace program 
(PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Latvia participated in more 
than 200 PfP exercises in 2000 and planned to participate in more than 190 in 2001. It is 
clear that Latvia views the PfP program as a vital tool for gaining invaluable practical 
operational experience in NATO missions. Similarly, Latvia values the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council as an opportunity to participate in the discussions, consultations, and 
joint decision-making process that form the basis for the Alliance's cooperation with its 
members and partners, and to improve Latvia's practical preparedness for incorporation 
into different levels of the NATO command structure.164 
In addition to the rhetoric of interoperability with NATO forces, Latvia has 
demonstrated her commitment to providing modern armed forces for NATO operations 
in more practical, concrete ways. Latvia has already demonstrated that her existing forces 
are capable of operating with NATO forces in real-world missions. To further develop 
this capability, Latvia's 2001 Annual National Program (ANP) committed Latvia to 
improving the combat and self-defense capabilities of the National Armed Forces and 
improve interoperability with NATO. To accomplish these goals, the ANP plans to 
further develop Latvia's command, control, and communications systems, develop a 
logistics system, develop a total defense planning system and further develop her air, 
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3. Resource Issues 
Like Estonia, Latvia is committed to preparing her budget expenditures to support 
the costs of NATO membership. Latvia determined in 1999 to gradually increase her 
defense spending each year to reach a goal of 2 percent of GDP by the year 2003. As the 
percentage of GDP allocated to defense spending has grown, so has the need for a 
resource management system to ensure proper allocation and expenditure of resources. 
Latvia is currently developing a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
for the Ministry of Defense. Such a system would allow Latvia to more efficiently plan 
future defense expenditures. In addition, since January 2000, Latvia has used a single 
system for the control and monitoring of defense resources, which has streamlined and 
made more efficient the accounting process.166 Overall, Latvia has recognized the need 
for more efficient budgeting and accounting mechanisms with respect to the defense 
budget, and has established mechanisms to address these needs. 
4. Security Issues 
Latvia began implementing information security mechanisms with the 2000 
Annual National Program. Specifically, in 2000 Latvia introduced security programs in 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and implemented necessary staff security 
clearance programs. In addition, Latvia certified the security program in the National 
Armed Forces and began managing NAF staff security clearances.167 In 2001, Latvia 
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planned to enlarge the state's classified information register system, improve the 
classified information protection regimes in state institutions involved in the NATO 
integration process, improve the system for exchange and storage of classified 
information, and continue to train personnel in accordance with NATO requirements.168 
Latvia obviously appreciates the importance of classified information security. 
5.        Legal Issues 
Latvia began the process of harmonizing her legislation with NATO requirements 
in 2000. The Laws on National Security and on National Armed Forces, for example, 
were elaborated to remove any discrepancies with NATO legislation, and were 
subsequently approved by the Saeima. In addition, amendments to existing laws, such as 
the "Law on the Status of Foreign Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of 
Latvia" and the "Law on Entrance and Stay of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters 
and Ports of the Republic of Latvia and their Departure Thereof," were amended to allow 
foreign armed forces and naval vessels to legally be in Latvian territory and waters, a 
necessary requirement for Latvia to host NATO or PfP exercises.169 The 2001 ANP 
continued this process and focused on restrictions and prohibitions related to Latvian 
defense, Latvian integration into NATO and the legal basis for the use of force, residence 
and status of NATO troops and personnel in Latvia, and participation by NAF units in 
military operations abroad.170 Like Estonia, Latvia is committed to ensuring no legal 
roadblocks will prevent her from joining the Alliance. 
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E.        CONCLUSIONS 
During the 1990s, Latvia began to try to find her way out of the chaos engendered 
by the 50 years of Soviet domination and the sudden collapse of her oppressor, and to 
plant herself firmly in the West. Implementing this goal was no simple task, and Latvia 
met with strong opposition on the way, especially from Russia. Latvia's solution to the 
problem of how to integrate with the West was to foster integration and inclusion at 
home. Ethnic Latvians were neither strong enough, nor did they constitute a sufficient 
proportion of the population, to force other ethnic groups in Latvia to submit to their 
desires. Consequently, Latvia's path to Western integration has been paved by Latvian 
integration. Integration and inclusion are the most important aspects of Latvian foreign 
and domestic policies, and the key to understanding Latvia's priorities for Western 
integration. 
Latvia's efforts toward integration with the West have been centered on the tools 
articulated by Foreign Minister Berzins in October 2000. These tools, sustained economic 
development, promotion of common values, and cultural pluralism and diversity, have 
been the focal point of integration efforts at home and abroad. Specifically, Latvia's 
attempts to fulfill the membership requirements of the EU have been heavily influenced 
by these tools. This should come as liuttle surprise given Latvia's position on the EU as 
the best way to support her national interests and reinforce her sovereignty. Politically, 
Latvia has focused significant efforts on naturalization of her minority populations and 
equal rights for the same. Economically, Latvia has focused on building the legislative 
framework and institutions necessary to support sustained economic growth. In terms of 
implementing the acquis, Latvia has encountered difficulties, but she strives diligently 
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nonetheless,   guided  by  the   Foreign   Minister's  tools.   The  requirements   for  EU 
membership mesh quite well with those tools. 
If Latvia has focused so heavily on the EU, what, then, of NATO? Latvia views 
NATO as a guarantor of stability and a check against uncertainty. She understands the 
importance of NATO, and fervently seeks membership, as evidenced by her plans to 
bring her defense budget in line with NATO requirements. At the same time, NATO 
accession has assumed an almost secondary role for Latvia. Perhaps this is because 
NATO has been less than enthusiastic of late about enlargement. Perhaps it is because 
Latvia has already meets many of the requirements for NATO membership, and thus does 
not have to strive as hard. Perhaps, indeed, Latvia believes the expansion of the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) will provide the same guarantees that NATO currently provides its members. The 
answer is unclear. 
As with Estonia, it is difficult to determine Latvia's foreign policy priority toward 
NATO and the EU. Latvia has made the task even more difficult by claiming to want 
integration with both equally. Despite this, Latvia's foreign policy statements and her 
actions seem to point toward a greater affinity for the EU. The EU seems to more closely 
mirror Latvia's quest for inclusion and integration at home. Additionally, Latvia 
recognizes the possibility of future military integration with the EU. Consequently, the 
EU would seem to have everything Latvia is looking for. 
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IV.    LITHUANIA'S PRIORITIES FOR WESTERN INTEGRATION 
A.        INTRODUCTION: WHY WOULD LITHUANIA WANT TO INTEGRATE 
WITH WESTERN EUROPE? 
Although addressed last in this thesis, Lithuania is actually a nation of firsts. 
Lithuania was the first of the three Baltic republics to declare independence from the 
Soviet Union, on 11 March 1990. Lithuania was the first of the three to have been an 
independent state.171 Lithuania was the first, and only, European country to hold the 
Nazis legally accountable for their subversive tactics before the Second World War.172 
Finally, Lithuania was the first of the three Baltic republics, in 1993, from which Russian 
troops were withdrawn following independence. In addition to these firsts, Lithuania was 
the least colonized by Soviet immigrants during the Soviet period, and emerged from the 
period of Soviet domination as the most ethnically homogenous of the Baltic republics, 
with roughly 80 percent of her population composed of ethnic Lithuanians.173 Thus 
Lithuania, although similar in some ways to each of the other Baltic republics, forged a 
unique path to independence, and continues to forge a unique path to Western integration. 
1. Historical Context 
Lithuania is, by far, the oldest of the three Baltic republics. Lithuania first became 
an independent state when the Grand Duke Mindaugas united the various Lithuanian 
tribes sometime around the year 1230. The ancient Lithuanian state was beset by hostile 
forces to the east, in the form of the pre-Russian Muscovite state just then emerging from 
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the chaos of Mongol rule, and the west, in the form of German crusaders based in 
Königsberg.174 To better face this dual challenge, Lithuania formed a union with Poland 
to the south in 1386, a union that would later form the basis for bitter rivalry between the 
two in the wake of the First World War. Russia partitioned the Polish-Lithuanian 
kingdom in three waves in 1772, 1793, and 1795, and Lithuania formed a part of the 
Russian Empire from 1795 until regaining her independence in 1918.175 
Lithuania regained her independence in 1918 almost by accident. The Treaty of 
Versailles and US President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" did not specifically 
mention Lithuania as one of the nations to be restored to statehood after the First World 
War.176 In fact, the Western powers fully expected Lithuania to be absorbed by Poland. 
Because of the fear of the spread of Communism into Western Europe, the Western 
Powers forbade Germany, which had occupied all of Lithuania and parts of the other 
Baltic republics during the war, to withdraw her forces until the Baltic region was able to 
defend itself.177 Lithuania emerged from the First World War with her two traditional 
oppressors, Germany and Russia, in ruins, and had only to fend off expansionist claims 
by Poland. 
The Soviet Union, built on the ashes of the defeated Russian Empire, annexed 
Lithuania in 1940 along with Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania spent her years of Soviet 
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domination in much the same way as did Estonia and Latvia, with one significant 
exception. Lithuania was never colonized or Russified to the extent that Estonia and 
Latvia were.178 The early years of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) were 
marked by violent guerilla warfare as Lithuanian partisans fought in vain to throw off 
Soviet domination. The resistance did not end until 1953, and possibly had an effect on 
the failure of the Soviet leadership to Russify the region. Whatever the cause, the result 
was that Lithuania emerged from her years of Soviet domination in 1990 as the most 
ethnically homogenous of the three Baltic republics; the proportion of Lithuania's total 
population that is ethnic Lithuanian remained approximately 80 percent from 1939 to 
1989. This ethnic homogeneity was important for Lithuania's resumption of 
independence in 1990, and led to a much smoother transition to independence than her 
sister Baltic republics experienced. 
An important distinction between Lithuania and the other two Baltic republics is 
that Lithuania aspired, through the restoration of independence, to become the "Nation of 
Lithuania" rather than the "Lithuanian Nation."179 The restoration of the Republic of 
Lithuania was proclaimed on 11 March 1990, and because the overwhelming majority of 
the population was ethnic Lithuanian and had little to fear from Lithuania's ethnic 
minority groups, no form of defensive nationalism developed in Lithuania and citizenship 
in the restored republic was based on territorial boundaries rather than ethnicity. The 
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decision on citizenship and statehood essentially boiled down to a focus on combining 
ethnic and linguistic principles with recognition of the importance of the historical 
boundaries of the old multicultural Lithuanian principality.180 
Despite the relative ease with which Lithuania proclaimed the restoration of her 
independence, and possibly as a result of her border with the Kaliningrad Oblast, the 
Soviet Union was reluctant to let her leave peacefully. The Soviet Union responded to 
Lithuania's 11 March 1990 declaration of independence by dispatching Red Army troops 
and tanks to Vilnius to take control of Lithuanian Communist Party buildings. When the 
threat of force failed to bring the rebellious province to heel, Soviet Premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev, on 13 April 1990, threatened an economic blockade unless Lithuania 
returned to Soviet control in two days.181 The Soviets lifted the blockade in June 1990 
after Lithuania agreed to set a 100-day moratorium on any further discussions on 
independence. For the next year, Lithuania and the Soviet Union maneuvered back and 
forth around the issue of negotiations to discuss sovereignty and independence, but no 
negotiations ever took place. In Jan 1991, the Soviet Union broke the stalemate and sent 
additional paratroop regiments to Lithuania.'82 
Over the next three days, these troops seized state industries and Lithuanian 
Communist Party assets as Gorbachev demanded the restoration of the validity of the 
Soviet and Lithuanian SSR constitutions. On 11 January 1991, the first blood was spilled 
when Soviet troops took over government buildings in Vilnius. Further bloodshed 
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occurred on 12-13 January as Soviet tanks stormed the television transmission tower in 
Vilnius, killing 15 and wounding 500.183 Western condemnation of this action forced the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. A February 1991 referendum on the creation 
of an independent democratic Lithuanian Republic revealed that of the nearly 85 percent 
of the population that voted, more than 90 percent favored the creation of such a 
republic.184 Tensions between Lithuania and Russia flared into violence again during the 
August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow.185 Russian Interior Ministry troops carried out 
intimidation and terrorist tactics during this period, and attempted to seize control of the 
Lithuanian government. Following Russian President Boris Yeltsin's successful repulse 
of the coup, the Lithuanian Saeima (parliament) and the Russian Federation Duma 
ratified a treaty in which Russia officially recognized Lithuanian independence. 
2. Kaliningrad - Gateway or Black Hole? 
Unlike the other two Baltic republics who share an eastern border with the 
Russian Federation, Lithuania borders Russia only to her west, in the form of the 
Kaliningrad Oblast.186 Kaliningrad, all which remains of the former German province of 
East Prussia, is a true relic of the Cold War, having been given to the Soviet Union at the 
Potsdam Conference in 1945. During the Soviet period, Kaliningrad formed the 
westernmost bastion of Soviet power, housing the homeport of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and 
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close to 200,000 Red Army soldiers. Following Baltic independence in 1991, Kaliningrad 
became an isolated exclave of the Russian Federation. The Russian leadership had hoped 
that through the creation of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Kaliningrad, the oblast 
would become a Russian Hong Kong and a gateway to the Baltic Sea. These hopes never 
materialized and today Kaliningrad faces significant economic difficulties. Specifically, 
Kaliningrad must contend with continued reliance on increasingly obsolete industries, a 
crumbling infrastructure, declining agricultural fortunes, and a lack of development of 
new industries.187 In addition, Russia never fully committed to the idea of the SEZ or 
gave it a well-defined focus. As a result, the expected economic windfall never 
materialized, and Kaliningrad became a net importer of goods rather than a trading 
powerhouse. Thus, Kaliningrad presents a special dilemma for both Russia and Western 
Europe as integration efforts in the Baltic region continue to progress. Lithuania finds 
herself directly in the middle of this dilemma. 
Kaliningrad presents a special problem for the future of Western integration 
efforts in the Baltic region because of its geographic position in relation to present and 
possible future members of both NATO and the EU. Surrounded by Lithuania to the 
north and east, and Poland to the south, Kaliningrad faces a possible future of being 
surrounded by the EU, or NATO, or both. Such a situation would change Kaliningrad's 
position from being an exclave outside Russia to a Russian exclave that is also an enclave 
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geographically within the EU or NATO.I88 At the same time, Kaliningrad presents a 
unique opportunity for Western Europe as a chance for Russia and the West to develop a 
good relationship through collaboration on a solution to Kaliningrad's problems.189 
Russia seems to be unclear herself on the future of the oblast. In effect, Kaliningrad 
represents the last vestige of the Russian Empire and its vision of the Baltic region as a 
"window to Europe." As Russia struggles with her future as either a great power or 
regional power, Kaliningrad represents the choice between Russia as a nation state or an 
imperial power.190 
Lithuania finds herself caught in the middle of this shifting oasis of dilemma and 
opportunity. Lithuania does have some historic claims to the Kaliningrad region - as do 
most of the oblast's neighbors, both near and far - but these claims have had little 
influence on her present involvement in Kaliningrad. Instead, Lithuania hopes to help 
Kaliningrad develop into a stable economic partner capable of contributing to the 
growing economic strength of the Baltic Sea region. To this end, Lithuania and 
Kaliningrad signed an agreement for economic, cultural, and social development on 29 
July 1991, and entered into force in June 1992. In addition, a further agreement between 
the two concerning transit and energy resources' supply was signed on 29 July 1999. 
These agreements form the basis of all cooperation between Lithuania and Kaliningrad, 
and make Lithuania one of Kaliningrad's primary trading partners. To further coordinate 
cooperation between these two regions, the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad Cooperation Council 
188
 ibid., 14. 
189
 Chris Donnelly, "Kaliningrad from a Security Perspective," in The EU and Kaliningrad, 216. 
190
 Vejas G. Liulevicius, Is Kaliningrad Really Lithuania Minor: The Baltic Crucible of National 
Identities (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1995), 21. 
91 
was created in June 2000 to act in a supervisory status over all cooperative efforts.191 A 
stable and productive Kaliningrad will be to every European country's benefit as the EU 
and NATO expand to include more and more of the Baltic Sea region. 
B.        LITHUANIA'S   PRIORITIES   WITH   REGARD   TO   NATO   AND   EU 
ACCESSION 
Like her Estonian and Latvian neighbors to the north, Lithuania has long 
expressed a desire for integration with both the EU and NATO. In 1998, then Foreign 
Minister Algirdas  Saudargas professed Lithuania's understanding that the modern 
concept of security encompasses more than traditional defense considerations, and that 
security considerations in the 21st century are more dependent on the promotion of 
economic growth, the creation of stable democratic institutions, and the furtherance of 
transatlantic integration. He further stated the events of the 20th century have proven that 
the two mutually supportive processes of political and economic integration and the 
strength of NATO have been instrumental  in  safeguarding European  security and 
stability.192 By observing international principles, intensifying her preparations for EU 
accession, and developing and implementing her NATO program, Lithuania would be 
ready in the future to assume her rightful role in promoting European cooperation, 
security, and stability.193 This idea is just as relevant to Lithuania's foreign policy goals 
today as it was in 1998. 
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In a November 2000 resolution on the Lithuanian government's program for 2000 
- 2004, the Seimas articulated foreign policy goals with respect to the EU and NATO that 
were broadly in line with Foreign Minister Saudargas's 1998 statement. The November 
2000 resolution considered EU and NATO membership as being of equal value. The 
Seimas further stated the government would spare no effort to prepare Lithuania for EU 
accession by 2004, and that the government would make "much effort" to prepare 
Lithuania for NATO membership by 2002.194 This resolution further defined Lithuania's 
goals, and laid the groundwork for the codification of Lithuania's foreign policy. 
Based on these assertions, Lithuania's current Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis, 
has argued that Lithuania underwent a period of restoration in her foreign policy in 
conjunction with the restoration of her independence. By 2001, however, the period of 
restoration had ended and Lithuania was entering a new, crucial stage in her foreign 
policy, the primary goals of which are integration into the EU and NATO. Lithuania 
defines these foreign policy goals as follows: 
• Speedy accession to the European Union through political and diplomatic means, 
• NATO accession through political and diplomatic means, 
• Maintenance and development of good neighborly relations, 
• Intensifying Lithuania's economic diplomacy, and 
• Contributing to international community efforts in ensuring democracy, human 
rights, peace, and stability. 195 
These are essentially the same goals outlined by Estonia and Latvia in earlier chapters, 
but what do they mean for Lithuania? Simply put, Lithuania deems EU and NATO 
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accession as being of equally vital importance. At the same time, as will be seen, greater 
effort seems to be focused on accession to the EU. 
C.        INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Like her neighboring Baltic republics, Lithuania views membership in the 
European Union as a top priority of her foreign policy. In a February 2000 statement to 
the Conference on Accession to the European Union, in Brussels, then Foreign Minister 
Algirdas Saudargas called EU membership a precondition for modernization of 
Lithuania's economy and society, as well as for full-fledged participation in the 
international community.196 A January 2001 statement by the Seimas seconded this 
sentiment, and expressed the hope that Lithuania's integration with the EU would create 
preconditions for ensuring political, economic, and social stability and improve the 
quality of life of the Lithuanian people.197 Thus, membership in the EU will be the best 
way to ensure the future stability of the common values of democracy and the rule of law 
that Lithuania shares with the rest of Europe. 
1. Political Criteria 
Lithuania's political system has been arguably the most stable and democratic of 
the three Baltic republics since the restoration of independence in 1990. The 1997 
European Commission Opinion on Lithuania's membership application fairly gushed 
over the well-oiled Lithuanian political system. The opinion describes Lithuania's system 
as functioning properly and in conditions of stability, and favorably noted that the regular 
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elections held in 1992 and 1996 were both free and fair, and in each case permitted an 
alternation of power under the proper conditions. The Commission further reported 
Lithuania had no major problems regarding respect for fundamental rights, and noted that 
while Lithuania had not yet abolished the death penalty, the President had placed a 
moratorium on such judgments in 1996. The only criticism leveled at Lithuania's 
political system by the 1997 Opinion was the need for continued efforts to improve the 
operation of the judicial system and the fight against corruption.198 As with Estonia and 
Latvia, Lithuania faces difficulties in the judicial system due to insufficient numbers of 
lawyers and judges, slow prosecution of cases, and rendering of judgments. 
The European Commission's 1998 Regular Report continued to heap praise on 
Lithuania for her well functioning political system and policies enacted to address 
problem areas. The 1998 Report favorably noted that the Presidency changed hands in 
1998 in a free and fair election and in accordance with the law. The Commission also 
noted Lithuania had made substantial progress toward reform of the judicial system with 
increased numbers of both judges and lawyers and the establishment of a specialty 
training department within the Ministry of Justice to address the issue of inadequate 
judicial training.199 In addition, Lithuania made significant progress in the fight against 
corruption with the adoption of a body of legislation in 1997 and 1998 aimed at ridding 
the public sector of corruption. For example, the Law on the Compatibility of Public and 
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Private Interests in the Public Service, the Law on Financing Political Campaigns, and a 
government decree on measures against economic, financial and organized crime all 
entered into force between July 1997 and April 1998.200 The report recommended 
continued efforts in this area. The Commission did express continued concern over the 
inability, in some cases, of the Lithuanian judicial system to meet the basic rights laid out 
in the constitution, such as the right to counsel, free legal aid, and a speedy trial, but did 
note that some positive progress had been achieved in these areas.201 No problems were 
noted with respect to minority rights. The Commission concluded by saying that, as of 
1998, Lithuania fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria.202 
Lithuania continued to make progress toward solving these problem areas in 
1999. The 1999 Regular Report noted a further increase in the number of judges, and the 
implementation of several reforms aimed at making the judiciary more efficient, to 
include greater specialization of judges in county and district courts, the revision of the 
Code of Civil Procedure to shorten procedures, the establishment of a Judicial Court of 
Honor to address judicial accountability, and the requirement for all future applicants to 
the judiciary to be qualified in the field of EU law. In terms of the fight against 
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corruption, Lithuania adopted a long-term Program of Prevention of Organized Crime 
and Corruption and enacted the High Commission of Ethics in Office, the 
recommendations of which were instrumental in the November 1998 dismissal of a 
government minister.203 In the area of the protection of human rights, the Commission 
noted Lithuania's abolition of the death penalty in December 1998 and the subsequent 
ratification of the European Convention Protocol on the death penalty, the only protocol 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms that Lithuania had not yet ratified.204 In addition, Lithuania passed the Law on 
Equal Opportunities of Men and Women and ratified the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which added to her already strong 
record in the area of human rights. As a result of these efforts, the Commission remarked 
that Lithuania continued to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria, and recommended 
continued efforts to complete necessary reforms of the judiciary and in the fight against 
corruption. 
The 2000 Regular Report continued to heap praise on Lithuania for her fulfillment 
of the political criteria. The Commission noted that despite strong efforts by Lithuania in 
2000, little reform was accomplished primarily due to budgetary constraints. Despite 
these constraints, Lithuania did adopt new Civil and Criminal Codes and enacted an 
intensive training program for judges in EU law and acquis enforcement. The 
will be ready to accept new members 
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Commission noted the need to speed up judicial reforms, especially with regard to the 
improvement of judicial qualifications in EU law and in streamlining court 
proceedings.205 Lithuania took a number of important steps with respect to the fight 
against corruption, including the adoption of the Law on the Special Investigative Service 
(May 2000), the adoption of rules concerning the public declaration of private interests of 
civil servants (April 2000), and the adoption of the Law on Lobbying Activities (June 
2000). Despite these efforts, the Commission noted the need for Lithuania to adopt a 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy to oversee all efforts in this area.206 Lithuania also 
continued her strong record in terms of human and minority rights in 2000 with the 
ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities, the establishment of a Commission on Equal Opportunities aimed at 
coordinating the implementation of equal rights legislation, the adoption of legislation 
regarding the protection of children's rights. In addition, Lithuania adopted a program 
aimed at the social and cultural integration of national minorities, and specifically, in 
June 2000, adopted a National Program for the Integration of the Roma Minority.207 
Overall, the Commission noted Lithuania continued to fulfill the political criteria, with 
specific emphasis required on the noted problem areas to further improve this area. 
2. Economic Criteria 
During her years of Soviet domination, Lithuania overcame the lack of 
industrialization present at the end of the interwar years. During the Soviet era, Lithuania 
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established a well-developed energy sector that was able to supply all of the Baltic 
Region of the USSR. Agriculture and food production also retained their traditional 
importance during this period. Despite these relative strengths, Lithuania's economy 
suffered from the same deficiencies of the centralized Soviet planned economy that all of 
the former Soviet republics suffered. The result was that Lithuania had to develop the 
framework and institutions of a functioning market economy in order to survive in the 
post-Soviet world. 
The 1997 Commission Opinion noted that Lithuania's transition to a market 
economy had made considerable progress since 1991. Specifically, the Commission 
noted Lithuania's progress in liberalizing and stabilizing the economy, to include the 
implementation of, or plans for price liberalization, voucher and cash privatization, the 
opening of trade, legal reform, institutional development, and the enhancement of the 
social safety net. At the same time, the Commission noted the need for better tax 
collection, better enforcement of legislation regarding competition, and the strengthening 
of the banking system.208 In terms of the ability to cope with the internal pressures of the 
EU, the Commission concluded Lithuania would be ill equipped to compete in the EU in 
the medium term, and primarily recommended the need for restructuring and 
privatization of the industrial enterprise and agricultural sectors.209 
The 1998 Regular Report noted some progress by Lithuania in the areas addressed 
in the 1997 Opinion, and recommended areas for increased reform efforts. The 
Commission noted substantial progress in enterprise privatization, especially in the 
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shipping, telecommunications, dairy, and sugar industries, and sales of state-owned 
companies accelerated in 1998. In fact, the private sector produced nearly 70 percent of 
the state's GDP in 1998.210 In addition, land restitution progressed satisfactorily, with the 
return to private ownership of 55 percent of all land restitution claims. Reforms in the 
banking sector allowed it to increasingly fulfill its role, although the overall development 
of the banking system remained low.21' Lithuanian exports to the EU constituted 33 
percent of total exports, while imports from the EU accounted for 46.5 percent of the 
total imports. Lithuania's primary exports were low value goods that required large 
amounts of labor and natural resources, while the main imports from the EU in 1998 were 
machinery and vehicles.212 Finally, the Commission noted Lithuania needed to become 
more efficient in her use of energy resources, and should restructure the energy sector in 
general, to include the development of a functioning regulatory and financing framework. 
Overall, the Commission noted that sustained implementation of a reform agenda would 
complete the establishment of a market economy and enable Lithuania to successfully 
compete in the EU marketplace. Consequently, the Commission recommended the 
completion of the reform agenda for the regulatory framework and the implementation 
and enforcement of existing legislation.213 
As with Estonia and Latvia, the 1999 Regular Report noted some difficulties 
related to the 1998 Russian financial crisis, but noted the general ability of the Lithuanian 
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economy to cope with the stress. Privatization continued to progress, although too slowly 
in key sectors such as banking, oil refinery, and energy, and privately owned companies 
continued to account for approximately 70 percent of Lithuania's GDP. Additionally, 
land restitution continued to proceed slowly, but steadily. The economy's legal 
framework improved due to amendments to the Company law that improved market entry 
and exit procedures, the enactment of the Law on Competition, and sustained 
enforcement of the Bankruptcy Law. Finally, the banking sector survived the Russian 
financial crisis, but faced continued threats due to the possibility that creditors could still 
default on loans.214 The Commission noted the need for further improvement in the 
legislative framework and the need for greater privatization of large enterprises and 
banks. In terms of trade, the 1999 Report noted increased levels of both imports from and 
exports to the EU, with a corresponding decline in trade with the CIS. Trade with the EU 
accounted for 50 percent of Lithuania's exports and nearly the same percent of her 
imports in 1999. The Commission recommended Lithuania continue to improve the 
quality and type of her goods for export to the EU, in order to continue this positive trend 
in trade.215 
Lithuania showed strong progress in 2000 after the comparatively slow progress 
of 1999. Privatization neared completion in 2000 with the most significant progress being 
in the sale of 81 percent of the state's oil exploring and production company. Land 
restitution also continued at a good pace in 2000 with 78 percent of the restitution claims 
completed. The banking sector weathered the Russian financial crisis and managed to 
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Start channeling savings toward the private sector to a much greater degree.216 Lithuania 
made substantial progress in enterprise restructuring with the most important progress 
being the preparation of two energy companies, Lithuanian Energy and the Gas 
Company, for privatization by the end of 2001. These efforts represent a significant 
achievement in enterprise restructuring. In addition, Lithuania continued to integrate her 
trade with the EU with percentages of imports and exports to the EU rising above 50 
percent of total imports and exports. Finally, the Commission noted the general transition 
of Lithuania's economy away from state protection to market policies.217 Overall, the 
Commission remarked that Lithuania had developed a functioning market economy that 
would be able to cope with competitive pressures in the EU in the medium term, provided 
the structural reform and legislative reform programs continued. 
3. Ability to Assume the Obligations of Membership 
In his opening statement at the February 2000 Conference on Accession to the 
European Union, then Foreign Minister Saudargas highlighted several areas of the acquis 
that were of special importance to Lithuania. These areas were the energy sector, 
agriculture and fisheries, regional policies, the environment, and transportation.218 Since 
they were designated as being of special importance, these areas will form the basis of 
this discussion of Lithuania's ability to assume the obligations of membership. This does 
not mean, by any stretch of the imagination, that all other areas of the acquis have been 
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successfully implemented,  only that  Lithuania holds  these  areas to  be the most 
troublesome. 
a)        Agriculture and Fisheries 
In 1997, the European Commission noted that unresolved issues of land 
restitution claims and establishment of ownership patterns blocked the development of a 
functioning land market, which resulted in a corresponding lack of investment in farms, a 
necessity for modernizing agriculture.219 In addition, the Commission noted a 
fundamental lack of policies necessary to the successful implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Consequently, the Commission recommended completion of 
agricultural land restitution and strengthening administrative structures related to the 
implementation of the CAP. In terms of fisheries, the Commission concluded the primary 
issues Lithuania needed to address were modernization of the fisheries sector and the 
establishment of a fisheries administration to manage fishing stocks, processing, and 
trade and capable of managing the necessary restructuring and modernization.220 
The 1998 Regular Report from the Commission noted some progress in 
the agricultural sector in 1998. Specifically, the Commission noted limited progress 
toward aligning agricultural policies with the CAP, primarily through the introduction of 
a price regulation system along the lines of the CAP. At the same time, the Commission 
noted limited progress in land restitution and the need for further restructuring to create a 
functioning land market and a viable farming sector. Overall, however, the Commission 
noted the need for further efforts    to restructure the agricultural sector, develop 
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environmental and rural development policies, and align the sector for implementation of 
the CAP.221 The Commission noted no progress toward reform of the fisheries sector in 
1998. 
The 1999 Regular Report noted further progress in the agricultural sector, 
particularly along the lines of aligning policies for the implementation of the CAP. In the 
fisheries sector, Lithuania took efforts to make the sector more efficient and introduce 
greater decision-making capacity by dividing responsibility for the sector between the 
Ministries of Agriculture (fisheries policy, administration, and integration) and 
Environment (fishing control, evaluation of damage to resources, and application of 
compensatory measures). Significant efforts were still required to reform the fishing 
sector since most of the recommended reforms from previous years had yet to be 
addressed.222 
Finally, the 2000 Regular Report noted satisfactory progress in the 
agricultural sector, and noted the establishment of the basis of the legal and 
administrative framework for the CAP. The Commission noted the need for further 
reforms to strengthen this framework, particularly in terms of developing systems, 
procedures, control and audit mechanisms, as well as adequate training for administrative 
personnel.223 In the fisheries sector, Lithuania made some progress in 2000, primarily in 
the area of resource management, inspection, and control with the adoption of the Law on 
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Fisheries in June 2000.224 The Commission recommended greater efforts in terms of the 
alignment of legislation and strengthening the Fisheries Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, a necessity for the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy, and 
strengthening of conservation efforts by the Ministry of Environment.225 
b)        Energy Sector 
In terms of the energy sector, the 1997 Commission Opinion noted no 
major problems with respect to fulfilling the requirements of the acquis in the future. At 
the same time, the Commission recommended Lithuania address issues of monopolies in 
the sector, access to networks, prices, emergency preparedness, to include the buildup of 
emergency stocks, energy efficiency, and environmental norms. In addition, the Opinion 
noted the need for a long-term policy to address the aging nuclear power plant at 
Ignalina, a Chernobyl-style nuclear reactor nearing the end of its life cycle.226 
The 1998 Regular Report noted some progress in the energy sector in 
1998, but commented on the need for greater efforts to bring this sector in line with the 
acquis. In particular, the Commission noted the absence of a satisfactory energy strategy 
and the need for long-term waste management strategies. In addition, the issues 
highlighted in the 1997 Opinion remained largely unaddressed.227 
In contrast, the 1999 Regular Report reported significant progress in the 
energy sector in 1999. This progress manifested itself primarily through the adoption of a 
national energy strategy in October 1999. Of particular importance was the development 
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of a timeline in the energy strategy for the shutdown of the Ignalina nuclear plant by 
2009228. The Commission prasied this accomplishment despite noting the issues 
highlighted in the 1997 Opinion still remained largely unaddressed. 
Lithuania built on this success in 2000, and belatedly began to address the 
issues highlighted in the 1997 Opinion. For example, the adoption of the Electricity and 
Gas Laws began the process of increasing competition and access to networks in those 
areas, which was aided by increased privatization of electricity, gas, and oil utilities. The 
Commission noted the need for continued efforts in these areas to increase the 
administrative capacity of the sector.229 
c) Transportation 
The 1997 European Commission Opinion remarked that Lithuania faced 
little difficulty in meeting the requirements of the acquis in the transportation sector. The 
Commission recommended particular attention to safety improvements, especially in the 
maritime sector, and harmonization of environmental standards in transportation, such as 
air pollution, noise, etc. In addition, the Commission recommended Lithuania begin 
laying the foundation for the future extension of the trans-European transportation 
network, primarily in terms of administrative and supervisory bodies.230 This network is 
of particular importance to a country with significant transit issues like Lithuania. 
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Lithuania made some limited progress in the reform of the transportation 
sector in 1998. In particular, with respect to safety, Lithuania established the State 
Inspectorate of Inland Waterways Navigation at the end of 1997, and reorganized the 
Civil Aviation Administration in 1998. Lithuania addressed a portion of the issue of 
environmental protection through the adoption of the European Convention on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road in June 1998.231 Overall, the Commission noted 
this progress and recommended further efforts toward the improvement of aviation and 
maritime safety. 
Lithuania focused heavily on improving legislation relating to safety in 
1999. In the maritime sector, Lithuania adopted a large number of ministerial orders 
related to certificates, ship inspection, training, and reduced seaport charges for double 
hulled tankers. This legislation was desperately needed since safety of Lithuanian flagged 
vessels had declined during each of the preceding three years. In the aviation sector, 
Lithuania concentrated on negotiations for a multilateral European Common Aviation 
Agreement that covered, in particular, implementation of the acquis with respect to 
aviation safety. In addition, Lithuania succeeded in bringing road transport legislation 
partially in line with the acquis in areas such as international freight and passenger 
transport, drivers' licenses, and transportation of dangerous goods. At the same time, 
efforts toward fiscal harmonization of this area, in terms of vehicle taxation and road user 
charges were not implemented. Overall, the Commission recommended greater efforts, 
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especially in terms of financial and human resources, for reform of the maritime and 
aviation sectors and fiscal harmonization of the road transport sector.232 
Lithuania achieved mixed success in the transportation sector in 2000. 
Limited progress occurred in the road transport area in terms of driver training and the 
adoption of legislation regarding the movement of hazardous goods, but fiscal 
harmonization was not addressed. Lithuania adopted a new Law on Civil Aviation in July 
2000 provided for the establishment of a Civil Aviation Administration and a Civil 
Aviation Inspectorate. In the maritime area, Lithuania adopted the Law on Maritime 
Safety in August 2000.233 For the future, the Commission recommended greater efforts in 
the road transport are to strengthen the administrative capacity of existing institutions and 
to address technical, safety, and fiscal concerns. The Commission further recommended 
strengthening administrative structures in the maritime are to bring this area more in line 
with the acquis.234 
d)        Regional Policies 
Lithuania is far less urban than either Estonia or Latvia, and is largely 
rural in nature. In 1997 the Commission noted several problems with respect to regional 
development, including: 
• Low quality of the infrastructure, 
• Pockets of industrial decline and/or urban crisis, 
• Problems with conversion of defense activities, and 
• A general decrease in incomes in rural areas. 
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The Commission further noted Lithuania had no regional development 
policy, nor did regional policy instruments exist as of 1997. Consequently, the 
Commission recommended the development, at the very least, of a general framework for 
an integrated regional development strategy, and the improvement of the administrative 
capacity necessary to manage such a program.235 
Lithuania approved regional policy guidelines in July 1998 that defined 
basic institutional structures and financial instruments for regional policy. However, the 
government did not implement the guidelines. Overall, the Commission commented that 
Lithuania's regional policy was still very much in a conceptual stage and that little 
progress occurred in this area.236 
Lithuania made greater progress in the area of regional policy in 1999. In 
particular, the government adopted a resolution on the implementation of Lithuania's 
regional policy in May 1999. This resolution established guidelines for the 
implementation of the regional policy, to include a list of priorities for coming years, and 
assigned responsibility for coordination of regional policy to the Ministry of Public 
Administration Reforms and Local Authorities. In addition, also in May 1999, the 
government approved the establishment of the National Agency for Regional 
Development, scheduled to begin work in 2000, with the responsibility for preparing the 
National Development Plan, regional programs, and related planning activities. The 
Commission recommended further efforts aimed at improving the decision-making 
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progress, inter-ministerial coordination procedures at the national and between the 
national and regional levels, and budgetary and financial control procedures.237 
Lithuania made some progress in 2000 in the area of regional policy, 
primarily in the legislative framework and development of the National Development 
Program. For example, Lithuania adopted a law on regional development in July 2000 
that established the legal basis for the formation of regional development policy and the 
use of EU structural funds. The Ministry of the Interior assumed responsibility for the 
development of regional policy after the government abolished the Ministry of Public 
Administration Reform in November 1999. The National Agency for Regional 
Development became operational the same month. Despite this streamlining of the 
administrative structure, the Commission noted the need to improve the actual National 
and Regional Development Plans to make them more comprehensive.238 In addition, the 
Commission recommended the establishment of regional and national level partnerships 
as a means to improving planning and project design.239 
e) Environment 
Lithuania's environmental situation was much better in 1997 than that of 
either Estonia or Latvia, largely due to a significant decline in industrial and agricultural 
production following the restoration of independence. Lithuania adopted a National 
Environment Strategy in 1996, and by 1997 made significant progress in the adoption of 
legislation aimed at stricter standards with respect to water and air quality, in particular, 
and the cleanup of contaminated areas, in general. The Commission recommended a 
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significant  increase  in  environmental  investment  and  a major effort to  reinforce 
administrative capacity to ensure long-term compliance with legislation.240 
Lithuania achieved a great deal of progress in 1998 in the environmental 
sector. The majority of Lithuanian efforts in 1998 were directed toward the adoption of 
legislation designed to being Lithuania more in line with the acquis. In addition, efforts 
began toward the reorganization of enforcement structures to streamline administration, 
increase training, and improve equipment. Based on these accomplishments, the 
Commission recommended Lithuania concentrate on reinforcing the overall monitoring 
infrastructure and securing necessary investment to continue reforms.241 
The 1999 Regular Report focused primarily on Lithuania's need to begin 
to implement the environmental programs she had already developed. For example, in 
October 1998, Lithuania adopted the Strategy for Approximation in the Environment 
Sector, a program that set priorities for each environmental sector, established key 
implementation measures and target dates for each sector, developed cost estimations, 
and provided reinforcement for the environmental institutional infrastructure.242 In many 
ways, this was a comprehensive strategy aimed at bringing Lithuania's environmental 
policies fully in line with the acquis. At the same time, however, the Commission 
correctly noted that strategies and policies are useless without proper implementation. 
The   Commission   also   noted  that   despite   Lithuania's   substantial   efforts   in   the 
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environmental sector, significant effort remained to establish a structure fully capable of 
implementing and enforcing the acquis. The Commission recommended Lithuania focus 
in the future primarily on these efforts.243 
The 2000 Regular Report determined Lithuania was continuing to make 
progress in both implementation of the acquis, and in establishing an infrastructure 
capable of enforcing it. Significant efforts were still required in nearly every area of the 
sector, but the Commission noted Lithuania had developed an administrative structure 
capable of overseeing the implementation of the acquis. Specific attention was called to 
the large number of redundant institutions focused on the environment. The report 
recommended getting rid of duplicate organizations to streamline the infrastructure. 
Overall, by 2000 the Commission noted Lithuania was in a good position to successfully 
implement the environmental portion of the acquis in the medium term. 
D.        INTEGRATION WITH NATO 
Lithuania views NATO as a vital component of the European security structure, 
and the guarantor of the hard security guarantees Europe requires. Lithuania is a firm 
believer in the concept of the indivisibility of European security, and has contributed to 
the maintenance ofthat security since the restoration of her independence.244 Lithuania's 
pursuit of membership in NATO is based on this idea of indivisible security, and 
recognizes the need for good neighborly relations between countries, building armed 
forces to be ready in the event of threats, to defend Lithuania's statehood and the growing 
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community of shared values.245 Indeed, in a 1999 speech, then Chairman of the Seimas 
Vytautas Landsbergis called NATO accession, "The second stage of liberation."246 
1.        Political and Economic Issues 
Like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania is a democratic country founded on respect for 
the rule of law, human rights, and democratic pluralism. The following topics mirror 
those discussed in the previous two chapters. 
a) Respect for Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Lithuania is a multi-party, parliamentary democracy, based on the respect 
for human rights, private property, civil society, and the rule of law. These core principles 
of her government are enshrined in the state Constitution, which was adopted by popular 
referendum on 25 October 1992. The Constitution guarantees human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all individuals residing within Lithuanian territory.247 Article 2 
of the Constitution states that sovereignty shall be vested in the Lithuanian people. 
Article 5 states that the scope of governmental powers shall be defined by the 
Constitution.248 Security and national defense legislation, to include the state 
Constitution, provides the basis for democratic control of Lithuania's armed forces. The 
Constitution vests the authority as the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian Armed 
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Forces in the President of the Republic. The State Defense Council, of which the 
President is the chairman and the Prime Minister is a member, coordinates issues of 
national defense. The Constitution grants to the Seimas the authority to impose martial 
law, announce mobilization and demobilization, approve all defense expenditures, and to 
make decisions regarding the use of the armed forces in defense of the homeland or for 
the fulfillment of the international obligations of Lithuania.249 
b) Respect for Peaceful International Relations 
Ironically, given her history of violent opposition to foreign influence, 
Lithuania is a strong believer in maintaining peaceful relations with her neighboring 
states, as well as with states that are further from her borders. As a region of transit 
between EU and non-EU countries, and for Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast, friendly 
relations are a necessity. In addition, Lithuania believes that regional and sub-regional 
security and stability, while certainly no substitute for transatlantic security and stability, 
are important components of maintaining a peaceful and prosperous Europe. Based on 
this belief, Lithuania actively promotes cooperative efforts with the other Baltic 
republics, Russia, Kaliningrad, Belarus, and maintains bilateral military relations with 
approximately 20 other countries, including Poland, the United States, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. 
"öv 
Lithuania views participation in peacekeeping operations as her direct 
contribution to building stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Lithuania has 
participated in all of the major NATO peacekeeping operations in the last decade, to 
include UNPROFOR, IFOR, and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR in 
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Kosovo. In addition, Lithuania strongly supported the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 
1999 as a means to reestablish peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, besides 
these more traditional peacekeeping missions, Lithuania has also provided civilian police 
forces to the UNTAES mission in Eastern Slavonia, the UNMIBH mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the UNMIK mission in Kosovo.250 
Further proof of Lithuania's commitment to peaceful international 
operations has been her relations with the Russian Federation. Lithuania bases her 
relations with Russia, in part, on the Lithuanian-Russian Treaty on the Foundations of 
Interstate Relations signed on 29 July 1991. In addition, Lithuania has emphasized the 
importance of adhering to the principles enshrined in the instruments of the OSCE, to 
include the right of every state to choose or change security arrangements as they see fit 
for the best interests of the state. Lithuania concluded peaceful negotiations on the 
delimitation of her border with Russia in October 1997 with the signing of a treaty 
defining state borders and a treaty establishing an exclusive economic zone in the Baltic 
Sea.251 Lithuania's continued good relations with the Kaliningrad Oblast are further 
testament to her belief in the importance of peaceful international relations. 
c) Respect for the North Atlantic Alliance 
Lithuania is a firm believer in NATO's mission, and supports the 
Alliance's efforts in recent years to broaden its role and missions. Lithuania fully 
supports NATO's approach to security in the 21st century, and seeks to contribute in 
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practical ways to the Alliance's efforts to preserve and reinforce Euro-Atlantic 
security.252 Furthermore, Lithuania believes that with the Cold War over, NATO can 
afford to turn its focus toward issues of transnational insecurity, ethnic and religious 
conflict, and "soft" security issues. In support of these beliefs, Lithuania has focused on 
developing her military capabilities to be able to act in conjunction with NATO or as a 
part of an Alliance coalition.253 Lithuania has demonstrated her overall commitment to 
the Alliance's policies and goals through her participation in NATO-led peacekeeping 
operations, and in all of NATO's partnership programs, to include, the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Planning and Review Process 
(PARP), Personal Staff Element (PSE) program, the Operational Capabilities Concept 
(OCC), and the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP). 
2. Defense/Military Issues 
Lithuania strongly believes in the idea of collective defense and the need for 
every European country to contribute to transatlantic security and stability. Lithuania 
does her part toward these goals through the maintenance of peaceful international 
relations, by building reliable and compatible defense forces capable of defending 
Lithuania, ensuring her own national security, and by contributing to crisis management 
in Europe through participation in peacekeeping and crisis prevention missions.254 In 
support of these goals, Lithuania is has been an active participant in nearly all of 
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NATO's, and has participated in all of the Alliances major peacekeeping operations in 
the 1990s. 
In addition to these international efforts, Lithuania has undertaken significant 
levels of reform at home. Starting in 1999, Lithuania began an extensive process of 
planning, review, and reorganization of her armed forces. At the administrative level, 
Lithuania began work on her National Military Defense Strategy and National Security 
Strategy in 1999; the State Defense Council later adopted the National Military Defense 
Strategy on 2 October 2000. Lithuania's 1999 National NATO Integration Program 
established the following log-term goals for the future development of her armed forces: 
• Introduction of command, control, and communications system, 
• Development of military infrastructure, 
• Development of logistics system, 
• Development of air defense capabilities, 
• Procurement of armaments and equipment, 
• Enhanced military education and training, and the development of an organic 
system for such training, and 
• Quality of life improvements.255 
The next year's program foresaw little change in these goals in the near term. Successful 
achievement of these goals would certainly improve both the quality of Lithuanian armed 
forces and their ability to operate with NATO and Partner country armed forces. 
3. Resource Issues 
Lithuania is keenly aware of the need to allocate sufficient material, financial and 
human resources in order to meet the requirements of NATO membership. Lithuania has 
made significant progress toward this goal since 1999. The first major step was the 
adoption of the Law on the Funding Strategy for the National Defense Establishment in 
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January 1999. This law tied defense spending to GDP, and established spending levels 
for the coming years to reach the goal of 2 percent of GDP for defense by 2001. 
Furthermore, the long-term goals of this law call for raising defense spending to 2.2 
percent of GDP if the economy continues to grow. In terms of long range planning, the 
Ministry of Defense embarked on a major program aimed at transforming Lithuania's 
planning and resource management system to enable it to cope with the pressures of 
NATO membership. The goals of this program are as follows: 
• Improve performance throughout the government and at all levels of the 
defense system, 
• Obtain the best value for money from scarce public resources, 
• Improve transparency and subject annual budget estimates to public scrutiny, 
and 
• Facilitate European integration and NATO membership.256 
Finally, Lithuania is in the process of implementing a Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System that will help to facilitate these goals.257 Accomplishment of all of 
these goals would improve Lithuania's ability to allocate scarce resources. 
4. Security Issues 
Lithuania developed her system for safeguarding the security of classified 
information in 1994 when she signed an agreement with the Alliance for the protection of 
such material. In 1995, Lithuania adopted legislation regulating the protection of 
classified information, and the Law on State Secrets and their Protection has been in 
force since its adoption in 1997. Thus, Lithuania has established a solid framework of 
legislation related to the security of classified information. The major problem Lithuania 
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agency in the country. To address this issue, Lithuania adopted a new Law on State and 
Official Secrets in July 1999, and entered into force in January 2000, that amended all 
previous legislation to bring them into full compliance with NATO standards.258 In 2001, 
Lithuania planned to address the issue of security for communications and information 
systems.259 
5. Legal Issues 
Beginning in 1999, Lithuania underwent a process of analyzing her legislative 
framework for compliance with NATO's legal system. Preliminary analyses of NATO's 
founding treaties and agreements, to include the 1949 Washington Treaty and the 1951 
Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Organization, revealed no fundamental 
differences between those documents and Lithuanian law. Three laws provide the 
foundation for Lithuania's cooperation with NATO - the Law on Fundamentals of 
National Security, the Law on Organization of the National Defense System and Military 
Service, and the Law on the Strategy of Financing. All are fully compliant with NATO 
legislation.260 In addition, by virtue of membership in the Partnership for Peace program, 
Lithuania has already signed a number of pertinent agreements dealing with cooperation, 
legal standards, training requirements, and rules on sharing information with NATO. 
Finally, Lithuania plans to complete her review of legislation and be in full compliance 
with NATO norms by the end of 2001.261 
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E.        CONCLUSIONS 
Lithuania's path to independence, like all of the Baltic republics, was unique. 
Like her sister Baltic republics, Lithuania emerged from the Soviet era ill prepared to 
assume the duties and obligations of a modern nation state, but in contrast to Estonia and 
Latvia, Lithuania was a much more homogenous nation state than either of the other two. 
Consequently, Lithuania has been able to focus more single-mindedly on integration with 
Western Europe without having to address such issues as large ethnic minority 
populations, and how those populations affect relations with neighboring states. Despite 
her unique approach to her post-independence life, Lithuania has essentially followed the 
same dual track foreign policy as Estonia and Latvia. 
Like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania desires membership in both the EU and 
NATO. Lithuania values the stability and security that each of these institutions, in its 
own way, provides Europe. However, it is interesting to note that, despite claims to the 
contrary, the two institutions do not seem to carry the same importance for Lithuania. For 
example, Lithuania's government program for the years 2000 - 2004 states the Lithuania 
government "will not spare [any] effort" to prepare Lithuania for EU accession by 2004, 
while at the same time the government "will make much effort" to get Lithuania ready 
for NATO accession in 2002.262 These two statements hardly seem to convey the same 
level of urgency. 
The answer to this dilemma may lie in Lithuania's path to restored independence 
and her geographic location. Lithuania was neither as heavily colonized nor Russified as 
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the other two Baltic republics during the Soviet period. Consequently, even though forces 
within the Soviet Union and Russia opposed her independence, Lithuania has not faced 
the same sort of threats to her national existence that the others have. Indeed, Lithuania's 
post-Soviet success has been built primarily on the homogeneity of her society and the 
opportunities this provides. For example, Lithuania has been able to give ethnic 
minorities large amounts of autonomy and access to both politics and economics because 
of the relatively low threat they pose to Lithuanians. Geographically, Lithuania sits 
astride the land route - through Belarus - between the Russian Federation and that 
country's Kaliningrad Oblast. The position of this isolated exclave on Lithuania's 
southwestern border provides both an opportunity and a dilemma. By engaging 
Kaliningrad politically and economically, Lithuania hopes to create a stable trading 
partner capable of contributing to the economic strength of the region. At the same time, 
cooperative efforts with Kaliningrad provide Lithuania the chance to be in the forefront 
of efforts to engage the Russian Federation in these same areas. 
Given these factors, it seems likely that Lithuania is focused more intently on EU 
accession. EU membership would likely be the best fit for Lithuania's policies of 
engagement with Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast, and would be the least likely to 
enflame Russian suspicion as to the motives of Western integration. Lithuania is certainly 
more ready to join NATO than she is the EU, but it seems unlikely that any of the former 
Soviet republics will be asked to join the Alliance until all of the difficulties with Russia 
have been worked out. 
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V. AN ASSESSMENT OF BALTIC PRIORITIES FOR WESTERN 
INTEGRATION 
"Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have their own lives. They are, first of all, 
sovereign states with their own models of state administration and 
domestic policies. They had their own separate histories for centuries and 
were at times influenced by different factors. Again - needless to say - 
they have unique cultures which, among other things, include jokes about 
one another."263 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of this thesis has been to dispel the myth that the three Baltic 
republics - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - are exactly alike and share the same vision 
for the future. By examining the domestic policy decisions that each of the three Baltic 
republics have made in conjunction with the membership requirements of the two most 
important Western European institutions, the European Union and NATO, this thesis 
attempted to show that very real differences do exist between the three. Each of the three 
republics has a different history. Each of the three became independent for the first time 
in 1918 under different circumstances. Each experienced the years of Soviet domination 
in different ways. Finally, each came to regain their independence in very different ways. 
All of these factors played an important role in their priorities toward Western 
integration. 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declared the restoration of their independence in 
1990, and after the recognition ofthat independence by the former Soviet Union in 1991, 
rejoined the Western world after nearly 50 years of Soviet domination and oppression. 
The world they found upon regaining their independence was very different from the one 
263 Vygaudas Usackas, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Lithuania, "European Union 
Enlargement and Finnish-Lithuania Relations," Address at the symposium on EU Enlargement and Baltic 
Sea Security, 12 October 2000, Helsinki. Available [online]: 
http://ww\v.urm.lt'data/3/EF31014107 1012usac.htm. 
123 
they left in 1939, and they were ill equipped to retake their places in the family of 
nations. Hard work and a clear vision of their ultimate goals have led them to where they 
are today, on the verge of full integration with Western Europe's two most important 
institutions, the European Union and NATO. 
1. Estonia 
Estonia seeks membership in both the European Union and NATO as the best 
way to achieve her goals of security and stability. Membership in the European Union 
would provide the necessary economic and political stability for Estonia's continued 
economic growth, while membership in NATO would provide "hard" security guarantees 
that would allow her focus on that economic and political growth. Estonia's goals seem 
to be fairly simple, but in reality they are much more complex. Estonia is likely in a 
better position currently to join NATO, but the bulk of Estonia's efforts are currently 
focused on the adoption of the EU's acquis. In Estonia's case, the question is not what 
does she desire, but what can she achieve. The next round of NATO enlargement may 
begin as early as 2002, for which Estonia would likely be ready. Similarly, EU 
enlargement is not scheduled to begin until 2004, and there is no guarantee that Estonia 
will be ready even then, although Estonia is in the first group of accession candidates 
with whom the EU is negotiating. 
Estonia's participation in NATO's partnership activities has formed a strong 
framework for the future of her defense forces and institutions. Her future goals are 
equally well defined, and are likely to continue to provide strong national armed forces. 
With respect to the EU, Estonia faces the difficult challenge of meeting all of the 
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requirements of the acquis.264 Meeting these requirements in time for accession in 2004 
would require strong, consistent effort in all areas of the acquis. Estonia's efforts have not 
been consistent and large amounts of work remain in some areas. 
Estonia's current government is fiercely aware of Estonia's history and her links 
to Europe. Based on this knowledge, the government has established Estonia's foreign 
policy priorities as security and stability. The EU and NATO are complimentary 
institutions that work together to fulfill this need. Each institution fulfills a distinct role, 
and membership in only one will not be acceptable. Membership in the EU provides the 
stability upon which NATO's military and defense guarantees rest, while NATO's 
guarantees offer the opportunity to pursue political and economic growth. Estonia seeks 
membership in NATO and the EU as two sides of the same coin. She seeks both at the 
same time, although most of her efforts are focused on the EU. Only time will tell what 
she will eventually achieve. 
2. Latvia 
In contrast to Estonia, Latvia met with strong opposition to her renewed 
independence from her former oppressor, Russia. Indeed, throughout her history, Latvia 
has had to fight for her independence. Upon regaining independence, Latvia chose to 
consolidate her position by fostering integration and inclusion at home. Latvia's ethnic 
Latvian population was not strong enough, to enforce its will over the entire country. 
Latvia's goal of integration and inclusion has been the most important factor in her 
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foreign and domestic policies, and the key to understanding her priorities for Western 
integration. 
Latvia's focus for this inclusionary policy was the system of tools articulated by 
Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins in October 2000: sustained economic development, 
promotion of common values, and cultural pluralism and diversity. In particular, Latvia's 
attempts to fulfill the membership requirements of the EU have been heavily influenced 
by these tools. Indeed, Latvia has identified the EU as being the best and most complete 
path to the realization of her national interests and the preservation of her sovereignty. 
Based on this designation of the EU, there would seem to be little room in 
Latvia's plans for NATO. This is not entirely true, and, in fact, Latvia does view NATO 
as a guarantor of stability and a check against uncertainty, and seeks membership in the 
Alliance. Despite these assertions, NATO accession appears to have taken a secondary 
role for Latvia. The deciding factor may prove to be Latvia's support for the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), concepts that could provide the same sorts of guarantees that NATO currently 
provides its members. 
Thus, it is difficult to determine Latvia's foreign policy priorities toward NATO 
and the EU. Despite claims to favoring membership in both, Latvia's official statements 
and actions seem to point toward a greater affinity for the EU. Indeed, the EU seems to 
mirror more closely Latvia's quest for inclusion and integration at home, while NATO 
seems more exclusive than inclusive. Consequently, Latvia seems to be leaning most 
strongly toward EU accession as a top priority. 
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3. Lithuania 
Like the other two Baltic republics, Lithuania's return to independence and her 
approach to Western integration have been unique. Lithuania's ethnic homogeneity put 
her in a better position to begin her quest for Western integration, while her geographic 
position imposed certain requirements for the conduct of her domestic and foreign 
policies. Despite her unique position and approach to Western Integration, however, 
Lithuania has essentially followed the same dual track foreign policy as Estonia and 
Latvia. 
Like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania desires membership in both the EU and 
NATO, and the stability and security that each, in its own way, provides. Like Latvia, 
however, the two institutions do not seem to carry the same importance for Lithuania. 
The answer to this dilemma may lie in Lithuania's history and geography. Lithuania was 
not heavily colonized or Russified by the Soviet Union, and consequently has not faced 
the same sort of threats to her national existence that the others have. Post -Soviet 
Lithuania has never had to fear being overwhelmed by ethnic minorities, or their parent 
nations. This homogeneity and the decision to include the minority populations in 
political and economic life have been key to Lithuania's post-Soviet success. Coupled 
with this factor has been Lithuania's ability to take advantage of her geographic position. 
By engaging the Kaliningrad Oblast politically and economically, Lithuania contributes 
to the overall stability and prosperity of the Baltic Sea region, and in bringing the Russian 
Federation closer to Europe. These efforts seem to fit more closely with the goals of EU 
integration than with NATO. Thus, EU membership would probably be the best fit for 
Lithuania's policies of cooperation and engagement. 
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B.        FINAL ANALYSIS 
In addition to addressing their integration priorities, this thesis also sought to 
answer a number of questions concerning the Baltic republics and their priorities for 
Western integration. For example, will it be possible to admit the Baltic republics singly, 
in pairs, or must they all be admitted together? Will all three of the Baltic republics be 
ready for admission when the call comes? How will the Russian Federation react to the 
admission of one or more former Soviet republics to Western institutions? It would be 
unrealistic to argue that the answers to these questions have been fully answered by this 
thesis, but they have all been addressed in some small part. 
The possibility does exist to admit only one or two of the Baltic republics in the 
next round of enlargement. However, the Baltic republics themselves, along with some of 
their staunchest supporters, have decried this idea as promoting the re-establishment of 
dividing lines and gray zones in Europe. Furthermore, they argue, failing to admit all of 
the Baltic republics would be tantamount to giving tacit approval to Russia's oft-stated 
right to surround herself with a cordon sanitaire of at least nominally friendly states. 
NATO member states, in particular, would not fulfill this requirement. Only by admitting 
all of the Baltic republics at the same time can the indivisibility of European security be 
maintained. Thus, while rhetorically it might be possible to admit only one or two of the 
Baltic republics, in reality they may have to be admitted as a single bloc. This is 
somewhat ironic given their efforts to distinguish themselves as distinct actors in the last 
decade.265 
2(
>5 This issue primarily refers to NATO accession. Russia strongly opposes admitting any or all of the 
Baltic republics to NATO, but has not expressed similar disapproval for their admission to the EU. 
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In terms of the Baltic republics' readiness for accession, it depends on which 
institution one is referring to. It is likely that all three republics will be ready to join 
NATO in 2002 should the Alliance decide to expand again at that time. The issue of 
readiness to accede to the EU is much more complicated. All three of the Baltic republics 
more or less currently fulfill the political and economic requirements of membership, but 
all are likewise unprepared to assume the obligations of the acquis. Each faces unique 
challenges in completing all of the work involved, and it is unlikely that all of the three 
will be in full compliance by 2004. The critical factor in this determination has little to do 
with determination, but more likely with time. All three of the Baltic republics show 
considerable desire to accede to the EU. However, they have only been working toward 
this goal, under the watchful eye of the EU, for less than a decade. Estonia began full 
accession negotiations in 1998, and Latvia and Lithuania began their negotiations in 
2000. It is very likely that the enormous amount of work required to bring a candidate's 
legislation, sectoral policies, administrative system, and the like into compliance with the 
acquis simply can not be done in this short amount of time. 
The issue of the Russian Federation is another important factor that must be 
addressed. As they have so often in the past, the Baltic republics find themselves in the 
middle of a debate raging between Russia and the West. On the one hand, the EU and 
NATO have acknowledged the desire of the three Baltic republics to become full member 
states. In the case of the EU, the Union has actively pursued this desire. NATO, however, 
has been somewhat less than exuberant in its pursuit of the Baltic republics, in part due to 
the difficulty of respecting Russian concerns and interests in the region. For its part, 
Russia would likely have little problem accepting the possibility of having three 
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additional EU member states on her western border. She already borders one EU 
member, Finland, and the trade possibilities produced by an extension of this border 
would likely outweigh any misgivings about the further loss of influence in these 
particular former Soviet republics. At the same time, Russia has repeatedly expressed her 
vehement opposition to the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in NATO. Despite 
claims to the contrary, NATO seems to have given tacit approval to this consideration. 
What, then, can be said about the priorities of the three Baltic republics regarding 
integration with Western Europe? Perhaps the best that can be said is that each of the 
three is pursuing integration in its own interests and based on the framework of its 
historical legacy, its current situation, and its vision of the future. One thing is certain, the 
Baltic republics are not the same, and the rest of the world should not treat them as such. 
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APPENDIX. NATO MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) 
The following is the full text of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 
Membership Action plan. It describes, in full, the characteristics of the plan, the 
membership requirements for prospective members, and the appropriate implementation 
of those requirements.266 
1. The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
remains open. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, 
Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm 
commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a programme of 
activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future 
membership. It must be understood that decisions made by aspirants on the basis 
of advice received will remain national decisions undertaken and implemented at 
the sole responsibility of the country concerned. 
2. The programme offers aspirants a list of activities from which they may select 
those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations. Active 
participation in PfP and EAPC mechanisms remains essential for aspiring 
countries who wish to further deepen their political and military involvement in 
the work of the Alliance. 
3. Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will 
be made on a case-by-case basis by Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the 
Madrid Summit Declaration, and the Washington Summit Declaration. 
Participation in the Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self- 
differentiation, does not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any 
guarantee of eventual membership. The programme cannot be considered as a list 
of criteria for membership. 
Implementation 
1. The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open 
Door, is divided into five chapters. These chapters are: 
I. Political and Economic issues 
II. Defence/Military issues 
III. Resource issues 
rv. Security issues 
V. Legal issues 
266
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Membership Action Plan" in The Reader's Guide to the NATO 
Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999 
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Within each, the MAP identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) 
and highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual 
membership can best be carried forward. 
The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute criteria for 
membership and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspiring 
countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address. 
2. Each aspiring country will be requested to draw up an annual national programme 
on preparations for possible future membership, setting objectives and targets for 
its preparations and containing specific information on steps being taken, the 
responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific 
aspects of those preparations. It would be open to aspirants to update the 
programme when they chose. The programme would form a basis for the Alliance 
to keep track of aspirants' progress and to provide feedback. 
3. Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format in the Council and other bodies and in 
NATO IS/NMA Team formats as appropriate. 
4. Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP issues will be provided through 
mechanisms based on those currently in use for Partners, 19+1 meetings and 
NATO Team workshops. These workshops will be held, when justified, to discuss 
particular issues drawn from the MAP. 
5. The NATO Team will normally be headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary 
General, Assistant Director of the International Military Staff, Head of Office or 
his representative. The NATO Team will liaise closely with the appropriate 
NATO bodies regarding advice to aspirants. Relevant procedures will be refined 
over time as experience is gained. Aspirants should make requests in writing for 
workshops to ASG/PA. He will be responsible for the implementation of the 
Membership Action Plan and the scheduling of meetings under the overall 
direction and coordination of the SPC(R). 
6. Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing 
feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national 
programmes. This document would form the basis of discussion at a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help 
identify areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant's discretion to 
commit itself to taking further action. 
/.      Political and Economic Issues 
1. Aspirants would be offered the opportunity to discuss and substantiate 
their willingness and ability to assume the obligations and commitments 
under the Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on 
NATO Enlargement. Future members must conform to basic principles 
embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty 
and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble. 
2. Aspirants would also be expected: 
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a. to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; 
b. to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; 
c. to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including 
irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good 
neighbourly relations; 
d. to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their 
armed forces; 
e. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the UN; 
f to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions and 
by promoting stability and well-being; 
g. to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace; 
h. to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by 
economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. 
3. Moreover, aspirants would be expected upon accession: 
a. to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation 
of peace and security; 
b. to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance through the sharing of 
responsibilities, costs and benefits; 
c. to commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus on 
all issues; 
d. to undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and 
decision-making process on political and security issues of concern 
to the Alliance; 
e. to commit themselves to the continued openness of the Alliance in 
accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Madrid and 
Washington Summit Declarations. 
Implementation 
4. Aspirants will be expected to describe how their policies and practice are 
evolving to reflect the considerations set out above (in paragraphs 1-2 
above), and to provide their views on, and substantiate their willingness 
and ability to comply with other parts of the NATO "acquis", including 
the NATO Strategic Concept, the development of the European Security 
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and Defence Identity within the Alliance, the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
and the NATO-Ukraine Charter. 
5. Aspirants would be expected to provide information on an annual basis on 
the state of their economy, including main macro-economic and budgetary 
data as well as pertinent economic policy developments. 
6. Aspirants would be asked to provide a written contribution to the NATO 
Team, which would then be passed directly on to the Allies for their 
comments. After appropriate consultation in the Alliance, the NATO 
Team would then convene a meeting to discuss the contribution provided 
and relevant political issues. Such meetings would be held yearly; 
additional meetings could be convened upon mutual agreement. 
7. An annual Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) meeting will be held 
to provide direct feedback from Allies to individual aspirants. 
17.      Defence/Military Issues 
4. The ability of aspiring countries to contribute militarily to collective 
defence and to the Alliance's new missions and their willingness to 
commit to gradual improvements in their military capabilities will be 
factors to be considered in determining their suitability for NATO 
membership. Full participation in operational PfP is an essential 
component, as it will further deepen aspirants' political and military ties 
with the Alliance, helping them prepare for participation in the full range 
of new missions. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share 
the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security 
and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance 
strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and as laid out in other 
Ministerial statements. 
5. Aspirants would be expected upon accession: 
a. to  accept  the  approach  to  security outlined  in the  Strategic 
Concept; 
b. to provide forces and capabilities for collective defence and other 
Alliance missions; 
c. to participate, as appropriate, in the military structure; 
d. to participate, as appropriate, in the Alliance's collective defence 
planning; 
e. to participate, as appropriate, in NATO agencies; 
f. to   continue   fully   to   support   PfP   and   the   development   of 
cooperative relations with non-NATO Partners; 
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g.      to pursue standardization and/or interoperability. 
Implementation 
3. The following measures are designed to help aspirants develop the 
capabilities of their armed forces, including by enhancing interoperability, 
to be able to contribute to the effectiveness of the Alliance and thus 
demonstrate their suitability for future membership. The measures build 
where possible on extant initiatives. 
a. Aspirants will be able in accordance with existing PfP procedures 
to request tailored Individual Partnership Programmes to better 
focus their participation in PfP directly on the essential 
membership related issues. Within each IPP, certain generic areas 
would be marked as being essential for aspirants, and aspirants 
would be invited to give due priority to those areas of cooperation. 
b. Annual Clearinghouse meetings for aspirants in a 19+1 format 
would be developed to help coordinate bilateral and multilateral 
assistance and maximise their mutual effectiveness to better assist 
them in their preparations for membership. 
c. Within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP 
and in accordance with PARP procedures, planning targets 
specifically covering areas most directly relevant for nations 
preparing their force structures and capabilities for possible future 
Alliance membership will be elaborated with aspirants. Aspirants 
will undergo a review process on their progress in meeting these 
planning targets. 
d. These planning targets will be established on the basis of 
consultations between each aspiring country and NATO and may 
be applied to any component of their force structures, rather than 
solely to their PfP-declared forces. 
e. PARP Ministerial Guidance will include approaches and specific 
measures which aspirants might adopt, in the context of the MAP, 
to prepare their forces for possible future NATO membership. 
f. The PARP Survey will be used for aspirants to seek more 
information and data in a number of areas, for example, general 
defence policy, resources, and present and planned outlays for 
defence. 
g. As a sign of transparency, and in accordance with PARP 
procedures: aspirants will be encouraged to circulate individual 
PARP documents to other aspirants in addition to circulating them 
to NATO Allies; and aspirants will be encouraged to invite, in 
particular, other aspiring countries to participate in the review 
process on planning targets. 
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h. Aspirants will be invited to observe and participate in selected, 
clearly defined phases of NATO-only exercises when Council 
decides to open these in accordance with current procedures. 
Priority consideration will be given to ensuring exercise 
effectiveness. 
i. Any future NATO facilities established for the assessment of 
Partner forces for NATO-led peace support operations and of 
Partner performance in NATO/PfP exercises and operations will be 
used to assess the degree of interoperability and the range of 
capabilities of aspirants' forces. If these assessment facilities are 
extended to encompass forces beyond those for peace support 
operations, they will be used to assist aspirants. 
j. Appropriate use may be made of simulation technology for 
training forces and procedures. 
III.     Resource Issues 
3. New Alliance members would be expected to commit sufficient budget 
resources to allow themselves to meet the commitments entailed by 
possible membership. National programmes of aspirants must put in place 
the necessary structures to plan and implement defence budgets that meet 
established defence priorities and make provision for training schemes to 
familiarise staff with NATO practices and procedures in order to prepare 
for possible future participation in Alliance structures. 
4. Aspirants would be expected upon accession: 
a. to allocate sufficient budget resources for the implementation of 
Alliance commitments; 
b. to have the national structures in place to deal with those budget 
resources; 
c. to participate in the Alliance's common-funded activities at agreed 
cost shares; 
d. to participate in Alliance structures (permanent representation at 
the NATO HQ; military representation in the NATO command 
structure; participation, as appropriate, in NATO Agencies). 
Implementation 
5. Through existing mechanisms, including those within PfP, possible 
internships and training sessions, and NATO Team workshops, aspirants 
upon request will be: 
a. provided advice on their development of national structures, 
procedures and mechanisms to deal with the above issues and to 
ensure the most efficient use of their defence spending; 
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b.      assisted in training the staff needed to man those structures and 
work in and with NATO. 
IV.      Security Issues 
3. Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient 
safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive 
information as laid down in NATO security policy. 
Implementation 
4. Appropriate courses may be made available, on request, to aspiring 
countries on Personnel, Physical, Document, Industrial Security and 
INFOSEC. Individual programmes for aspirants may be developed as 
warranted. The NATO Security and Special Committees may wish to meet 
with aspirants, whenever they judge it necessary or useful. 
V.      Legal Issues 
0. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, 
aspirants should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate 
legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within 
NATO. This should enable aspirants to scrutinize domestic law for 
compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations. In addition, 
aspirants should be properly informed about the formal legal process 
leading to membership. 
a. New members, upon completion of the relevant procedures, will 
accede to: 
The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4th April 1949) 
b. Upon invitation, new members should accede to: 
i. The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) 
(London, 19th June 1951) 
ii. The Protocol on the status of International Military 
Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty 
(Paris Protocol) (Paris, 28th August 1952) 
c. It is expected that new members accede to the following status 
agreements: 
i. The Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, National Representatives and International 
Staff (Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20th September 1951) 
ii. The Agreement on the status of Missions and 
Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization    (Brussels    Agreement)    (Brussels,    14th 
September 1994) 
d. It is expected that new members accede to the following technical 
agreements: 
i. The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for the Security of Information (Brussels, 6th March 
1997) 
ii. The Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of 
inventions relation to defence and for which applications 
for patents have been made (Paris, 21st September 1960) 
iii. The NATO Agreement on the communication of technical 
information for defence purposes (Brussels, 19th October 
1970) 
e. For possible eventual access to ATOMAL information, new 
members would be expected to accede to: 
i.      the   "Agreement   for   Cooperation   Regarding   Atomic 
Information" (C-M(64)39 - Basic Agreement); 
ii. the "Administrative Arrangements to Implement the 
Agreement" (C-M(68)41, 5th Revise); 
f. Domestic legislation of aspirants should, as much as possible, be 
compatible with the other arrangements and implementation 
practices which govern NATO-wide cooperation. 
Implementation 
2. NATO Team workshops will provide for briefings on legal issues and 
discussions on the steps that would have to be taken. Aspirants could 
provide information on existing legal arrangements and the steps that 
would have to be taken to accede to the agreements, including whether or 
not there are any constitutional/legal barriers to doing so. 
Aspirants might also provide information on whether and how domestic 
legislation might impede immediate and full integration into Alliance activities. 
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